From ‘Extremism’ Tactics to a South-East Shift: Dominant Information Manipulation Trends in H1 2024

Piotr Parfionenka, Pauliuk Bykouski

This report presents the findings from six months of research that employed content analysis to examine the information landscape in Belarus. The study analyzed both state-sponsored and independent media outlets to evaluate their adherence to fundamental journalistic standards—including credibility, accuracy, the separation of facts from opinions, representation of diverse viewpoints, and completeness of information. Special attention was given to identifying instances of propaganda, misinformation, and media manipulation.

Key findings

• The study revealed a high prevalence of irregularities in state-sponsored media, including substitution of concepts and framing. These manipulative techniques were employed to distort reality and shape the desired perception of events.This enabled the authorities to influence public opinion and promote specific ideological narratives.
• Most independent media outlets, especially those operating from abroad, have shown a strong commitment to upholding reporting standards. However, they face constraints due to difficulties in obtaining reliable information and their inability to provide comprehensive background details.
• Media IQ’s analysis revealed a consistent pattern of state-sponsored media reinforcing propaganda narratives designed to strengthen Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s rule. Meanwhile, the audience’s attention was diverted from genuine political processes to ideological myths.

Narratives

The Belarusian state-sponsored media actively promoted strategic narratives, which:

• Praised the Belarusian state;
• Discredited the West;
• Urged to «preserve the country», meaning the political regime, social model and their attributes;
• Highlighted that the West threatens and harms Belarus;
• Praised and justified integration with Russia;
• Praised Lukashenka;
• Emphasized the need to remember the Great Patriotic War.

Situational, tactical narratives included:

• Promotion of «Electoral Sovereignty»: emphasizing Belarus’s independence in conducting its own elections free from Western influence or judgment.
• Belarus as a Nation for the «Common People»: portraying Belarus as a country that prioritizes the needs and values of ordinary citizens.
• Emphasizing Military Security Rhetoric: amplifying messages about the importance of vigilance and defense against external threats.
• Discrediting the Opposition by Labeling Them as «Extremists»: undermining and delegitimizing opposition groups by branding them as extremists.

Analysis of media compliance with reporting standards

Media IQ monitors media’s compliance with the following journalistic standards: the completeness of information, distinction between facts and opinions, accuracy, the representation of diverse viewpoints, and source reliability. The chart below demonstrates average scores during two sample months.

A comparative analysis of the three media categories reveals that independent media operating outside Belarus had the fewest instances of non-compliance with established standards, while state-owned media violated these standards most frequently.

The most common deviation among all media outlets was a failure to meet the standard of completeness, although the specific ways this violation manifested differed across contexts.

Data from March indicate that state-sponsored media most frequently violated the standards of information completeness and the distinction between facts and opinions. These violations often involved manipulation, including fabrications and selective framing.

Non-state media in Belarus most often breached the standard of information completeness in their materials. While they did not engage in manipulation, they distorted the news by providing minimal commentary and omitting background or context, as well as leaving out inconvenient details. For example, when the Belarusian Defense Ministry released a statement claiming it observed signs of the West preparing for war, no details or evidence were provided. The non-state media did not offer background information, remained silent on NATO exercises, and failed to mention EU countries’ concerns about the potential for an armed Russian invasion of Lithuania or Poland through Belarus. This lack of transparency regarding the origins and progression of Russia’s military actions against Ukraine made the Defense Ministry’s statement appear disconnected from the ongoing conflict. Such a deviation from the standard of information completeness allows for the construction of an ideologically «correct» media reality without resorting to overt propaganda.

Independent media operating outside Belarus also violated the standard of information completeness, but in a different manner. In these instances, news was published without adequate context. For example, reports about media outlets being designated as «extremist» failed to clarify that this term is a manipulative concept and a euphemism used to ban media for political reasons. This omission supports the authorities’ narrative aimed at discrediting the protest movement and portraying dissent as criminal activity. This phenomenon is particularly noteworthy during the reporting period, as the second quarter of 2024 saw an unprecedented increase in the number of information materials labeled as «extremist,» a surge in the declaration of dissident groups and organizations as «extremist formations»—a record for the past eighteen months—and an uptick in individuals being recognized as «extremists» after a decline in 2023. Sociologist Henadz Korshunau associates the latter trend with the May election to the Coordinating Council of Democratic Forces.

The situation with state media demonstrates a clear correlation between breaches of journalistic standards and information manipulation. There is a direct relationship between the level of manipulation and the adherence to these standards, with lower ratings indicating a greater degree of non-compliance.

Information strategies and narratives of state-sponsored media of Belarus

Strategic narratives are defined by their consistency, internal logic, and alignment with the ruling regime’s deeply entrenched belief in its own legitimacy. These narratives form the backbone of information campaigns, crafted to shape public opinion over time. Through ongoing monitoring of information manipulation and influence, the following key strategic narratives have been identified in Belarusian state-sponsored TV:

Sure, here is the list of strategic narratives:

• Exalting the Belarusian state’s effectiveness and benevolence: praising the Belarusian state for its efficient functioning, dedication to the well-being of its citizens, and implementation of prudent and beneficial domestic and foreign policies.
• Discrediting the West as aggressive and hypocritical: portraying the West as an aggressive, immoral, and hypocritical force, aiming to incite distrust and aversion among Belarusians toward Western countries.
• Advocating for the preservation of the current regime: calling to «preserve the country,» which implies maintaining the existing political regime, social structure, and their associated attributes.
• Emphasizing Western threats to Belarus: highlighting that the West poses threats and causes harm to Belarus, reinforcing the notion of external adversaries undermining national stability.
• Promoting integration with Russia: praising and justifying closer integration with Russia as beneficial for Belarus’s prosperity and security.
• Glorifying Lukashenka’s leadership: commending Lukashenka for his personal qualities and his role in fostering Belarus’s prosperity, attributing national success to his leadership.
• Commemorating the Great Patriotic War as a unifying historical moment: emphasizing the victory in the Great Patriotic War as a foundational event in Belarusian history, fostering national unity and consensus around this shared heritage.

The following chart illustrates dynamics in promotion of these narratives between March and June 2024 (in accordance with the updated methodology).

The strategic narratives disseminated by state-sponsored television channels reflect a particular worldview. The worldview promoted by the Belarusian authorities suggests that the current «benevolent» government provides a high quality of life for its citizens, while the «malevolent» West threatens the well-being of the Belarusian people. This «good versus evil» dichotomy is reinforced by referencing the Great Patriotic War as a unifying historical moment. Within this narrative, the Belarusian authorities are portrayed as the heirs of the partisans who resisted fascism, whereas the West and internal dissidents are depicted as «Nazis» and «collaborators.» Simultaneously, Russia is cast as the savior—analogous to the Red Army in the 1940s—coming to the aid of Belarus, which is presented as being surrounded by «Nazis.»

“The members of the special police unit, the ones who qualified for the black berets, are the heirs of those heroes from 1941-1945. I’m confident that they’ll perform their duties to protect public order with honour and dignity. They’ll do everything they can to ensure a peaceful sky over our Republic of Belarus and peace and order in our streets”, a host says on Belarus 1 TV.

Tactical narratives construct specific portrayals of the world, adapting them to fit current circumstances. They operate as discrete messages that reinforce the credibility of strategic narratives. Relevant to immediate situations and tied to particular events, these tactical narratives are often quickly forgotten when circumstances change. Some effectively function as sub-narratives within the larger strategic narratives.

In March, the most common tactical narrative was that “Belarus is a democratic state governed by the rule of law”. It related to the parliamentary and local elections held at the end of February, as well as the preparations for the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly scheduled for April. The authorities aimed to convince the population that the people themselves are the true source of power and that accusations of electoral fraud made by the opposition and the West are unfounded. This narrative was further reinforced by related themes, including the claim that «the West itself is neither law-abiding nor democratic» (ranked 10th among the top 20 narratives), and efforts to discredit the protest movement and dissent (ranked 15th in the top 20).

In April, the leading narrative was that Belarus is as a “social state, a country to live in, established by and for ordinary people”, which was linked to the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly and its purported role in consolidating this vision. At the same time, the frequency of war-related narratives nearly doubled. These narratives encompassed topics such as Belarus’s peaceful disposition, the state’s efforts to provide military security, and the perceived threat from an increasingly militarized West.

In May, the prevailing narrative was that “Belarus is honouring the memory of the Great Patriotic War, preserving historical memory, and upholding the truth”. The narrative was strategically reinforced by leveraging Victory Day on May 9—the most significant state holiday—as a news hook.

In June, the same narrative maintained its top position in the ratings, associated with the anniversary of the Nazi attack on the USSR and the preparations for the Independence Day parade. Additionally, there was a significant surge in narratives praising integration with Russia, linked to developments at the Forum of Regions. These narratives emphasized the achievements of integration, shared history, and the bond between the peoples of Russia and Belarus.

Another emerging trend was the increase in narratives lauding the state’s effective management and fight against corruption, as well as personal praise of officials. This is connected to the need to promote personnel appointments at the end of June.

Furthermore, narratives criticizing the West’s policies regarding migrants crossing the Belarusian-EU border—often directed at Poland—became increasingly frequent. The purpose of these narratives is to convince the audience of the legitimacy of the Belarusian authorities’ actions in the conflict.

Methods of information influence employed by state-sponsored media

Manipulation of concepts through labeling, euphemisms, and dysphemisms is one of the key tactics employed by state-sponsored media. For example, Belarusian state media, following the example of their Russian counterparts, continue (though less frequently) to refer to the war in Ukraine as a «special military operation.» This terminology downplays the scale of the conflict and conceals the state’s military aggression. Saying «Russia started a war against Ukraine» conveys a very different message than «Russia started a special military operation,» illustrating the use of euphemism.

Another prominent example of manipulation of concepts is the label «extremism,» which the Belarusian authorities have indiscriminately applied to any form of dissent, peaceful protest, or opposition. This tactic has proven highly effective, evidenced by the fact that even independent media outlets have adopted the terminology imposed by the authorities when reporting on the designation of certain groups or materials as «extremist.» While these outlets usually place the term in quotation marks, they often fail to provide the necessary context to highlight the underlying manipulation (for further analysis, please refer to the section titled «Analysis of media сompliance with journalistic standards» above). Consequently, the concept of «extremism» has become increasingly entrenched and normalized in public discourse, particularly amid rising repression and an increase in such news stories. It is anticipated that over time, the term «extremism» will become a counterword, necessitating the creation of a new term to describe those who genuinely espouse extremist views. Currently, however, the use of such labeling primarily serves to discredit those who oppose the authorities.

An example of dysphemism is evident in the state-sponsored media’s use of the term «fugitive [беглые]» to describe Belarusians who have fled repression abroad. This pejorative term carries negative connotations, suggesting cowardice and defeat, and it also alludes to the concept of serfdom. Historically, «fugitives» were peasants who ran away from their masters—a comparison that aptly illustrates the regime’s perception of the people as subjects rather than citizens.

In February, Belarus held parliamentary and local council elections, followed by the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly in April. Coverage of these events involved manipulation of the concept of «democracy.» State-sponsored media promoted the narrative that Belarus has its own «real» democracy, unlike the West’s, which they labeled as mere «political technology.» According to this portrayal, Belarusian democracy is based on the principle of popular sovereignty, and the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly represents a unique form of direct people’s power, drawing upon the traditions of the Polatsk Veche.

In contrast, Western democracy is depicted as a system where elites bribe voters with money to gain control. Protests in Western countries are often misrepresented by propaganda as indicators that the populations do not support their governments. However, the presence of protests actually highlights the ability to exercise freedom of assembly and does not necessarily imply that a government is illegitimate or illegally elected.

Interestingly, Belarusian propaganda assessed the protests in Belarus quite differently. Instead of viewing them as signs of governmental illegitimacy, the protests were portrayed as performances by ordinary people who were incompetent and deceived or bribed by the West.

“The transfer of powers to the supreme representative body of the people’s power is a decision that has been widely accepted by the Belarusian people. This was formally adopted at the republican referendum on the introduction of amendments and additions to the Constitution in 2022”, a host reports on CTV Belarus. “Over the years of independence, our country has developed a distinctive model of political structure. And the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly has become the ultimate expression of popular democracy. No other state has a comparable practice of collectively making strategic decisions for the country. The delegates of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly represent all regions and social groups. The 7th People’s Veche comprises 1162 individuals”.

“The concept of democracy is exemplified in the footage from Poland, Belgium, and France”, says a presenter of All-National TV. “The collective power of the people is demonstrated when they block the streets with tractors, demanding their legal rights. Spectacular, though not very effective as of yet”.

At the same time, attention is diverted away from the electoral process, as numerous observers have reported widespread manipulation in all types of Belarusian elections. The delegates to the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly are not elected at all; they are effectively appointed by the authorities. State-sponsored media narratives also deflect from the fact that in Western countries, power changes hands as a result of elections—an empirical indicator of the electoral process’s real impact. Consequently, the propaganda machine emphasizes aspects of the situation in Belarus that support their desired interpretation, while downplaying or ignoring less favourable elements such as mass protests and evidence of electoral fraud. This is an example of framing, a fundamental manipulation technique used by state-sponsored media.

«Contrasting» techniques are often used to enhance other manipulation techniques. For example, state media may highlight Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s calls for peace while emphasizing the West’s supply of arms to Ukraine. This creates a clear distinction between those advocating for peace and those supporting military action.

“It’s time to negotiate peace. This appeal formed the basis of the discussions held at the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly”, states a presenter on Belarus 1 TV. “While the president made several important points <…>, one of his key messages was the call for peace. This applies to both our southern neighbour and Western societies. The adopted national security concept and military doctrine confirm that Belarus has no plans to attack any country. And we’re urging the whole planet to do the same. <…> It seems to me that no one has called for peace more than the Belarusian leader. <…> What did the USA and the West do to stop the war? Oh, they allocated more military money to Ukraine? Sent dozens, hundreds of weapons and equipment? Have their leaders called for peace on a daily basis? Of course, they all talk about peace. They do this and then, off camera, they continue to ensure that this war will not end until the last Ukrainian dies. But the West does not want to listen. The Anglo-Saxons have very different goals and objectives. They’re not about peace”.

By employing dichotomy and comparison, the narratives reinforce specific perceptions—portraying Belarus as an advocate for peace while depicting the West as an instigator of war. In reality, Belarus is a military ally of Russia, and in 2022, Russia launched attacks on Ukraine from Belarusian territory. The West, meanwhile, is supplying Ukraine with weapons for defense without directly entering the conflict. Lukashenka’s calls for «peace» are essentially demands for Ukraine’s capitulation rather than genuine compromise. This represents yet another instance of concept manipulation.

The term «Anglo-Saxons,» referenced in the quote above, functions as a simulacrum and exemplifies the use of a conspiracy theory. This purportedly enigmatic global elite—labeled as the «Anglo-Saxons» and contrasted with «ordinary people»—is claimed to control the United States. The U.S. is then depicted as the world’s hegemon, with other Western countries’ puppet governments subordinate to it. The introduction of the term «Anglo-Saxons» into Belarusian state-sponsored media discourse originated from Kremlin propaganda. Moreover, the conspiracy theory that the «collective West» seeks to subjugate Belarus is a fundamental component of Belarusian state propaganda.

State-sponsored media outlets use various strategies to shape the media narrative, including direct manipulation within individual news items or programs and by influencing the overall agenda. They control the focus and selection of stories by determining the ratio and frequency of topics and news events.

For example, a standalone news item highlighting Belarus’s achievements in agriculture might not contain any manipulation or misinformation. However, when this story is immediately followed by reports on farmers’ protests or rising food prices in the European Union, the juxtaposition creates a misleading contrast through selective framing and context manipulation. Simultaneously, state-sponsored media omit the fact that, according to certain metrics, Belarus is lagging behind Western countries in agricultural performance.

Another example is the enhanced promotion of narratives on state-run television about commemorative sites of the Great Patriotic War. These narratives are designed to evoke strong emotions and reinforce the value of triumph over Nazism. While this, in itself, is not an act of manipulation, this value is then appropriated by propaganda to justify dividing society and the world into opposing groups. Authorities are portrayed as the «successors of the victors,» while their opponents are depicted as «ideological followers of the Nazis.» Notably, state-sponsored media fail to acknowledge that certain practices employed by the Belarusian authorities—such as suppressing dissent, homophobia, and authoritarianism—bear striking similarities to those of the Nazi and fascist regimes of the 20th century. This stands in stark contrast to the positions held by Western countries and Belarusian opposition movements.

The objective of state-sponsored media is to shape the target audience’s perception of reality in a way that favors the ruling regime. The primary audience consists of Belarusian citizens and residents who support the government or remain neutral. The secondary audience includes dissidents, who may not directly consume state television but are still influenced by prevailing narratives disseminated through other channels, including non-state media, as well as the international community.

The relevance of these narratives varies depending on the specific target audience segment. The loyal audience is convinced of their views—that Belarus is a welfare state, a wonderful place to live, and that Lukashenka is an exemplary leader. The neutral audience is presented with pragmatic arguments: Lukashenka’s regime prevents Belarusian citizens from being directly involved in the Russia-Ukraine war and ensures the growth of welfare. Dissidents are meant to receive the message that protests have failed, their leaders are immoral and defeated, resistance is futile, and punishment is inevitable. The message to the international audience is that Belarus advocates for peace in Ukraine, supports international dialogue, and seeks to preserve its sovereignty.

Thematic analysis: key events and their coverage

February elections in Belarus

On February 25, Belarus held parliamentary and local council elections. State-sponsored media promoted voter participation, accused the opposition of attempting to disrupt the process, and legitimized the elections. They introduced a new concept, «electoral sovereignty,» to counter international non-recognition. This concept asserts that Belarusian elections are conducted without seeking Western approval and that only Belarusians have the right to decide their country’s future. Attention was redirected to international observers from the CIS and far-right European movements, who had no objections to Belarus’s «electoral sovereignty» and praised the exemplary organization of the campaign.

Independent media outlets outside Belarus highlighted the lack of alternative candidates, the absence of opposition figures, and various irregularities, including violations in signature collection and campaigning. They published expert comments, forecasts, and exposés on invited observers. However, in doing so, they sometimes deviated from reporting standards.

Non-state media within Belarus mostly confined their coverage to relaying official information, with minimal engagement in political topics. An exception was the outlet Tochka, which released several intriguing publications. In one, a journalist questioned the head of the Central Election Commission (CEC) about forced voting, presenting the story under the title «The CEC’s Guidance on How to Respond If You Are Forced to Cast a Ballot.» Another article, «The War Between the Beaver and the Donkey: Intriguing Details of the Parliamentary Election,» was «seeking to identify any intriguing issues» given that «the current election campaign appears somewhat lackluster from an external perspective» and that «it is unlikely that any significant ideological competition will emerge.» The article discussed potential speakers from the new composition of the House of Representatives and covered topics like «party elites,» «prospects of the Communists,» and «the mystery of the Republicans.» However, it lacked sufficient background information—for example, it did not mention that the remaining parties and movements in Belarus are effectively pro-governmental, while opposition groups have been dissolved.

All-Belarusian People’s Assembly

The All-Belarusian People’s Assembly on April 24–25 provided state media with an opportunity to discuss the «genuine» power of the people in Belarus, contrasting it with the discredited elites of Western countries, who are perceived as out of touch with their populations’ interests.

Independent media outlets sought to understand the authority of this newly established «highest representative body of the people’s power,» offering expert commentary on its format.

Non-state media inside Belarus aimed to comprehend the changes, emphasizing the revised role of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly as a mandatory authority rather than merely an advisory entity. They maintained a relatively impartial stance. Unlike state-sponsored media, which opposes both Belarusian and Western understandings of democracy, Tochka highlighted a quote from Lukashenka: «We do not deny progressive forms of Western European democracy. We integrate them into our political structure, into our culture, into our worldview, if they do not contradict our principles and values.»

Legislation on sexual orientation

In April, the Belarusian Ministry of Culture redefined the demonstration of «non-traditional sexual relations and/or sexual behavior» as pornography, grouping LGBT identities and sexuality alongside «bestiality, necrophilia, sadism, masochism, voyeurism, exhibitionism, transsexualism, fetishistic transvestism.» This practice of categorizing sexual orientation with perversions (some of which are punishable by law) is manipulative. The legislation perpetuates social discrimination, providing media with legal justification to incite hostility and discord on social grounds.

The adoption of a law in June banning «LGBT propaganda» in Georgia offered further context for Belarusian media. State-sponsored outlets leveraged these developments to discredit political opponents and Western countries, contrasting them with «anti-Western» and «traditional» values. Non-state media in Belarus presented the news neutrally. Independent media took a more comprehensive approach to LGBT-related issues; for example, MOST published an article about a Belarusian individual who organized a Pride parade in Poland. They also challenged propaganda narratives by questioning their veracity, as demonstrated by Zerkalo’s use of U.S. research to illustrate that same-sex marriage could mean stronger families.

Elections to the opposition’s Coordination Council

The election to the opposition Coordination Council of Democratic Forces on May 25–28 was extensively covered by independent media outlets outside Belarus. They provided detailed reporting on the nominees, conflicts between different political forces, and internal crises within the structure. Alongside factual information, they included analytical articles, explainers, and debates. In contrast, state-sponsored media and uncensored non-state publications did not cover the topic, instead focusing on the repression of election participants and perpetuating the narrative that opposition activism inevitably leads to persecution.

European Parliament Elections

The June elections to the European Parliament provided a platform for state-sponsored media to criticize European authorities. Allegations included that these authorities are merely puppets of the United States, are undemocratic, and fail to represent their people’s interests—specifically, the desire to end hostilities in Ukraine and establish collaborative relations with Belarus and Russia. The Belarus 1  TV channel expressed sympathy with disillusioned Europeans: «The recent elections to the European Parliament, the G7 summit, and the meetings in Switzerland have not fulfilled the expectations of millions of Europeans regarding the cessation of their countries’ involvement in the Ukrainian conflict.»

Both non-state media in Belarus and independent media outside the country inadequately covered the European Parliament elections. Independent reporters at least attempted to present the election outcomes and their potential implications. Overall, Media IQ researchers observed a lack of analysis on how the results could affect the European Union’s relations with Minsk, the situation of Belarusian emigrants in the EU, and support for Ukraine.

Media Space Dynamics and Forecasting

In the first half of 2024, a significant shift has been observed in the narratives propagated by state-sponsored media in Belarus. These outlets are increasingly focusing on justifying and supporting a reorientation of Belarusian foreign policy from the West to the East and South. This trend, which began in 2020, extends beyond merely praising Russia; it reflects a search for alternative pillars within the emerging «new multipolar world order.» These include countries like China, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan—all of which President Lukashenka has visited since the beginning of the year.

From March to June, there was a noticeable increase in narratives highlighting successful cooperation with Eastern and Southern countries, even without considering the ongoing praise of ties with Russia. This growth was consistent across similar narratives. The objectives of this shift are threefold: first, to disguise Belarus’s international isolation; second, to redirect attention to the country’s collaboration with states that recognize and legitimize Lukashenka’s regime; and third, to obscure the economic challenges Belarus faces due to sanctions. However, replacing economic cooperation with Western countries with partnerships in the East and South does not currently appear promising.

Alexander Lukashenko in Mongolia. Photo: president.gov.by

The remaining narratives and their clusters showed either no significant change or only situational shifts. For more detailed information on the dynamics of state media narratives, please refer to the section above titled «Information Strategies and Narratives of State-Sponsored Media in Belarus.»

It is reasonable to assume that state-sponsored media will maintain their current strategic narratives in the coming months. Additionally, there is a strong possibility that the trend of promoting a pivot to the South and East will continue, especially in the context of praising integration with Russia.

Moreover, we can anticipate the emergence of specific narratives related to upcoming events. The Day of National Unity in September offers an opportunity for the authorities to encourage Belarusians to unite behind Lukashenka, while also emphasizing the «benevolence» of the government toward pardoned political prisoners—even if no additional pardons are granted.

The upcoming November elections in the United States are likely to reinforce prevailing narratives in state-sponsored media. These narratives are already being shaped by the promotion of Donald Trump’s candidacy and the possibility of a shift in U.S. foreign policy toward a more favourable stance for the Belarusian authorities if he wins. Should U.S. policy change, we can expect a reduction in the negative portrayal of the West in state-sponsored media, along with an increase in narratives emphasizing Minsk’s commitment to peace and dialogue. However, this is unlikely to reverse the trend of pivoting toward the East and South.

The next presidential election in Belarus is scheduled to occur no later than July 20, 2025. It is reasonable to predict that state-sponsored media will maintain or even increase the frequency of strategic narratives that praise Lukashenka and advocate for preserving the status quo.

The narratives surrounding Ukraine will be influenced by prevailing circumstances and the evolving dynamics of the conflict. However, they may retain a certain inertia and remain susceptible to Kremlin discourse. In the first half of 2024, Media IQ observed a shift in Lukashenka’s rhetoric toward Ukraine. Previously, he referred to Zelensky as a «crum,» but later changed his address to «Mr. Zelensky» and even suggested «stopping the harassment of Ukraine,» noting that the majority of Ukrainians are «normal.»

Despite Lukashenka’s changes in tone, the rhetoric of state-sponsored media remained consistent. The same narratives were reiterated: Zelensky was labeled illegitimate, his government portrayed as a puppet subordinate to the West, and the regime branded as Nazi. Other key messages included claims that the war has reached a stalemate and peace talks are necessary; that the Russian Federation is liberating, not conquering, territories; that Ukraine is committing genocide against Russians; that Russia is winning; that the West is pressuring Ukraine to make peace to avoid World War III; and that the war is costing the West dearly. Concurrently, the most common narratives about Ukraine on state TV are indirect, suggesting that the war results from Western involvement, perceived as contrary to Ukrainian citizens’ interests. Among all narratives about Ukraine, only these two ranked in the top 30 in terms of frequency from March to June.

It is unlikely that Belarus will implement similar restrictions to those recently introduced in Russia, such as slowing down YouTube. This is because Belarusian state-sponsored media use YouTube channels to circumvent anti-Russian censorship and to promote Kremlin narratives to Russian-speaking audiences in Western countries.

Independent media outlets based abroad are facing significant challenges, primarily due to restrictions on access and funding, as well as ongoing repression. These challenges are expected to intensify leading up to the presidential election in Belarus, with journalists being detained and undesirable websites being blocked. Given the impending election, it is likely that the remaining social media pages on Russian-controlled platforms like Odnoklassniki and Vkontakte, as well as the sites of Belarusian independent media in Russia, will be subject to censorship or deletion. However, it can be reasonably assumed that external pressures will not affect the high level of adherence to journalistic standards maintained by independent media outlets.

Conclusion

Independent media outlets operating outside Belarus demonstrate the highest compliance with news reporting standards. Non-state media within the country perform slightly less effectively in this regard. In contrast, state-sponsored media are significantly more likely to breach these standards and often engage in manipulative practices.

State-sponsored media provide uncritical support to the authorities and portray opponents negatively. They promote integration with Russia and demonize Western countries, frequently exploiting the theme of the Great Patriotic War as a core national value. There has been a steady increase in narratives supporting a political shift from the West to the East and South.

The key manipulation techniques employed by state media include concept manipulation, framing, contrasting, and promoting conspiracy theories. These techniques are applied not only within individual publications and stories but also at the agenda level, influencing the overall correlation of topics within the discourse.

Regarding major events like the Single Voting Day and the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly, state and independent media in Belarus approached them from divergent perspectives. State media asserted that these events were uniquely democratic, while independent media offered more critical and analytical viewpoints. Non-state media within Belarus generally adopted a detached and neutral stance, occasionally engaging in critical analysis or raising problematic issues. Both state and non-state media largely ignored the elections to the Coordinating Council, except for reporting on the repression of participants. This approach served to discredit dissent and reinforce the perception of inevitable punishment. The European Parliament elections provided state-sponsored media an opportunity to discredit the European Union and Western democracy. Meanwhile, non-state and independent media offered inadequate coverage of these elections.

A notable trend is the justification and support for a shift in Belarusian foreign policy from the West toward the East and South, set against the consistent endorsement of integration with the Russian Federation.

It is anticipated that the current discourse, trends, and practices across all types of Belarusian media will continue until the end of 2024. Tactically, the media landscape will be influenced by several factors, including the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, the forthcoming presidential elections in the United States and Belarus, and various other local events. However, significant strategic changes are only expected in 2025.

The three types of media examined in this report exhibit different objectives and strategies for adapting to the context.

State-Sponsored Media

State-sponsored media outlets disseminate pro-government narratives and, supported by the state, are effective in doing so despite the poor quality of their content. This is evidenced by significant deviations from journalistic standards, manipulation, and sometimes a lack of factual information. Even news broadcasts on state television often resemble opinion programs, where opinions overshadow facts, making it difficult for the audience to discern the truth. Additionally, these media are utilized to spread Kremlin narratives both within Belarus and to Russian-speaking populations in Western countries via platforms like YouTube. They have successfully imposed their agenda, prompting some independent media outlets to react to their manipulation and disinformation. Furthermore, they have promoted their discourse by labeling protest activities, human rights activism, and journalism as «extremism,» a term that even some independent outlets fail to contextualize appropriately.

Independent Media

The independent media, which have been expelled from the country and are blocked within its territory, have largely avoided engaging in counter-propaganda and manipulation. Instead, they respond to state-sponsored media’s information manipulations by providing quality journalism and adhering strictly to established standards. The optimal response to manipulation is an even more rigorous commitment to journalistic principles, particularly concerning the completeness of information and the careful use of terms like «extremism.»

Non-State Media Within Belarus

Non-state media operating inside Belarus typically avoid political topics or present them in a neutral or pro-government manner to evade negative repercussions. However, there are exceptions, such as the Russian outlet Sputnik Belarus, which broadcasts Kremlin agendas, and the Belarusian outlet Tochka, which experiments with different approaches. Whether intentional or not, these media outlets often contribute to the pro-government discourse by retransmitting narratives from state-sponsored media.

Overall, there is a general lack of compliance with the standard of information completeness across Belarusian media, hindering efforts to improve the quality of the media landscape. Enhancing adherence to journalistic standards, especially among non-state and independent outlets, is crucial for fostering a more informed and balanced public discourse.