A Divided Reality: Analysis of the Belarusian Media in 2024

Media IQ’s annual review provides a comprehensive analysis of Belarus’s information space, assessing media’s adherence to journalistic standards and uncovering instances of information manipulation. The study examines both state-run and independent outlets, focusing on coverage of the war in Ukraine, domestic politics, and international affairs.

The January — June 2024 report is available here.

1. Executive Summary

1.1. Key trends in the Belarusian media landscape

In 2024, Belarus’s information system was marked by a deepening split in the information space. Inside the country, state-controlled media dominated, while independent outlets operated from exile, resulting in two parallel media realities with a minimal audience overlap.

This divide was exacerbated by the Belarusian government’s policy to suppress independent voices. Belarus ranks 166th out of 180 countries in the 2025 World Press Freedom Index, published on 2 May 2025 by Reporters Without Borders (RSF). As Pozirk news agency notes, Belarus is between Cuba and Azerbaijan. Belarus ranked 167th in the 2024 Index, 157th in 2023, and 153rd in 2022.

According to various public opinion polls, out of which the Chatham House survey from December 2024 is publicly available, Belarusians do not have access to comprehensive news coverage. National information space is dominated by state-sponsored Belarusian and Russian media that reach from 37 to 62 per cent of the regular media audience and promote narratives of “unity with Russia”, “stability”, and the “lack of alternative to [current] authorities”. While ignoring Belarusian state repressions and demonising the West, these outlets justify Russia’s war against Ukraine, legitimise authoritarian rule by endorsing manipulated elections, and cover up systemic human rights violations and restrictions on freedom of speech.

At the same time, independent media play a key role in shaping public opinion on significant issues, particularly attitudes toward the war in Ukraine. Research shows that 94 per cent of independent media consumers view Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine critically, while 61 per cent of state media audiences fully or partially support it. This underscores the importance of the independent media not only as sources of alternative information but as a factor that influences regional security and stability.

Despite the criminalisation of their content and widespread online censorship, independent Belarusian media retain an audience of about 20 to 39 per cent of the population. Liberal Russian outlets reach 16 to 38 per cent of Belarusians. International media, capable of offering alternative perspectives, have a more limited reach of 12 to 25 per cent. Access to Ukrainian media is particularly low (6 per cent), limiting public understanding of developments in the neighbouring country.

In 2024, despite operating in exile, Belarus’s independent media continued to uphold high professional standards. According to the Press Club Belarus’s research, all content produced by independent media undergoes multi-level checks. Operating from abroad, Belarusian independent media have built a unique and resilient ecosystem comprising around 45 media organisations of varying sizes and editorial policies that complement each other. This model differs from the exiled sectors of other countries, where only a few major outlets typically survive. Due to this unique setup, independent media maintain a reach of about 40 per cent of Belarus’s population and demonstrate high audience engagement: the average time spent on the websites of leading outlets exceeds 10 minutes per session.

In 2024, a group of experts from the Belarusian Association of Journalists (BAJ) initiated a community-wide discussion on a new self-regulation system for the Belarusian media.

Consultants reviewed proposals submitted for the Code of Professional Ethics for Belarusian Journalists and the Concept for an Ethical Self-Regulation Body in the Belarusian media sector. As BAJ Deputy Chair Aleh Ahiejeŭ stated, once 20 newsrooms adopt the new Code of Professional Ethics, a Media Ethics Council will be established: a body authorised to review violations of professional standards and issue rulings. “The main motivation for media outlets is to demonstrate their commitment to quality and compliance with ethical standards […] Endorsing these standards should enhance a publication’s reputation in the eyes of their readers, fellow journalists, and partners,” said Ahiejeŭ.

A significant gap remains between independent and state-run media in adhering to ethical standards.

Media IQ monitoring reveals that approximately 97 per cent of state TV broadcasts violated at least one standard of news journalism. According to Media IQ assessments, in 2024, state media systematically breached standards of accurate reporting. They employed manipulative techniques such as selective reporting, framing, and substitution of concepts. State-run media deliberately ignored key sociopolitical events and issues, contradicting fundamental principles of journalistic ethics. During coverage of the presidential elections, state media intentionally misrepresented reality, downplaying repression and ignoring the absence of conditions for the political activity of opposition or free expression of opinion. Instead, they pushed propaganda narratives about “national unity” and “popular support of the president’s course”.

According to data from the Belarusian Association of Journalists (BAJ), in 2024, the scale of repression against the media sector reached an unprecedented level. 45 media representatives remained behind bars, the Belarusian state conducted 66 searches, detained 27 media workers and was involved in at least 100 cases of covert pressure on journalists. Over the course of the year, authorities designated 35 media outlets and projects, including Media IQ, as «extremist formations».

In 2024, the Belarusian authorities actively expanded their repressive legislative toolbox. A new article was introduced to the Criminal Code: “unauthorised dissemination of information about the location of military equipment”. The government broadened the extraterritorial application of criminal laws and increasingly used “anti-extremist» legislation. For the first time, «retroactive inclusion in an extremist formation» was applied, expanding the list of individuals considered members of such formations after the outlet was introduced into the list of such groups. This was the case with the media projects Zerkalo and KYKY.ORG. There were also instances of single reposts from resources designated as «extremist formations» being treated as criminal offences of «facilitating extremist activity».

According to Belarus’s information Minister Marat Markaŭ, by September 2024, around 14 thousand internet resources had been blocked, with more than 5 thousand labelled as containing «extremist» content. The number of banned websites grew nearly 35 times compared to the period between 2015 and 2020. Authorities also annulled domain names of the websites included in the national list of extremist materials, forcing independent media to change web addresses, consequently complicating access to their archives.

As Reporters Without Borders (RSF) noted, for those who remain in Belarus, e.g. due to family obligations, giving up journalism offers no guarantee of avoiding repression. Authorities continue to persecute them for past publications and accuse them of “extremism”. Fearing further repercussions, families of those (ex)journalists sometimes refuse to publicise their arrests. Repressive measures have also extended to Belarus-based relatives of exiled journalists, who face searches, pressure, and intimidation. Persecution through proceedings in absentia has intensified. Even loyal journalists and bloggers can be targeted for instances of (largely constructive) criticism of authorities.

As per the U.S. Department of State’s assessment, Belarus is in a situation of total censorship and a complete lack of truly independent media inside the country. Non-state media in Belarus operate under a constant threat of repression, not for violating professional standards but for any criticism of the authorities.

The financial structure of the Belarusian media market reveals systemic inequality. According to the Association of Advertising Organisations (AAO) data, the advertising market grew by 18 per cent in the first nine months of 2024, with a projected annual volume of 241.31 million BYN (approximately €69.58 million). At the same time, state-run media received 170 million BYN in state subsidies (around €49.02 million), accounting for 70.8 per cent of the total advertising market volume. Independent media operating in exile are excluded from the domestic media business, with state television channels obtaining the lion’s share of the advertising market.

Unlike state media, which enjoy stable state subsidies and access to advertisers, independent outlets are entirely shut out of the domestic media economy. Thus, they are forced to rely on donor funding. In 2024, independent media faced a severe financial crisis due to cuts in international aid programmes. The suspension of U.S. support in early 2025 resulted in 40 to 60 per cent budget losses for various outlets. Further cuts are also expected from the European donors amid increased defence spending and shifting priorities.

Ahead of the 2025 presidential election, authorities tightened control over the country’s information infrastructure. On 31 December 2023 and again on 31 December 2024, authorities throttled access to YouTube during the New Year’s address by the opposition leader-in-exile Sviatłana Cichanoŭskaja. On 10 January, a seven-hour internet outage was officially attributed to “technical maintenance”. The cost of such outages is substantial — around $7 million for seven hours. These measures significantly limit the production and distribution of high-quality information content, especially on politically sensitive topics.

The control of internet infrastructure is enforced, among others, by using specialised Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) equipment provided by Sandvine, allowing authorities to analyse and filter web traffic.

In 2024, the state actively expanded its media infrastructure. In September, it launched the multimedia portal VIDEOBEL.BY to consolidate socio-political content from state media. The government also launched a new state TV channel, Piervyi Informacionnyi (First Information Channel), which was added to the mandatory public broadcasting package. In November 2024, during the Council of Ministers of the Union State meeting, Belarus and Russia established a joint media company. They also adopted a resolution to develop a unified information space strategy. This move signals deeper integration with Russia’s media landscape and further erosion of Belarus’s information sovereignty.

2. Information strategies and narratives

2.1. Strategic narratives and their evolution

Strategic narratives are relatively consistent, possessing internal logic and reflecting deeply entrenched views of the ruling regime’s leadership. These narratives form the backbone of information campaigns and are designed to exert long-term influence on public opinion. Through ongoing monitoring of information manipulation and influence, we identified the following strategic narratives on Belarusian state-sponsored television:

• Praising the Belarusian state apparatus for its efficient functioning, dedication to the well-being of its citizens, and implementation of prudent and beneficial domestic and foreign policies.
• Discrediting the West as an aggressive, immoral, and hypocritical force with the aim to incite distrust and aversion among Belarusians towards Western countries.
• Calling to “preserve the country”, which in turn implies maintaining the existing political regime, social model, and associated attributes.
• Pointing at external threats and harm originating from the West.
• Glorifying and justifying integration with Russia.
• Glorifying Alaksandr Łukašenka’s leadership, highlighting his personal qualities and his role in fostering Belarus’s prosperity.
• Commemorating the Great Patriotic War, presenting the victory in the Great Patriotic War as a foundational event in Belarusian history, which fosters national unity and consensus around this shared heritage.

The graph below depicts how these narratives’ proportions shifted in the rankings between March and November.

The graph shows that July and August of 2024 marked a turning point in the discourse. Before and after this period, the dynamics of strategic narratives remained stable, yet priorities shifted significantly during these summer months. Most notably, there was a rise in praise for Łukašenka and a decline in praise for the integration with Russia. Those changes likely correlated with Joe Biden’s exit from the U.S. presidential race. Minsk may have seen a potential victory for Donald Trump over weakened Democrats as the opportunity to reset relations under a new U.S. administration, as Trump’s previous term was quite favourable for Belarus-U.S. relations. It is likely that at that moment, Belarusian authorities began planning the national «re-election» for early 2025 with the goal of «resetting» the score between Łukašenka and Sviatłana Cichanoŭskaja and building ties between Łukašenka and Trump “from scratch”. This theory is supported by BELPOL’s 14 August report on the expected early election date, given the time lag needed for the information to reach their sources. Meanwhile, Belarusian state TV channels openly sided with Donald Trump in their coverage of the U.S. presidential election, following Łukašenka’s lead. A fringe narrative emerged: «Trump is America’s Łukašenka».

Despite the change of tone regarding the American election, the overall trend of discrediting Western countries and fearmongering about the “collective West” continued. The only slightly declining narrative was the one praising integration with Russia. This indicates that the official Minsk had no intention of «befriending» the West but instead distanced itself from Russia and reduced its dependency on it. The bet on Trump may have paid off: The New York Times reported in 2025 on a behind-the-scenes deal between the new U.S. administration and the Łukašenka regime about releasing political prisoners in exchange for easing sanctions.

2.2. Tactical narratives

Tactical narratives build on the worldview shaped by strategic narratives, adapting it to fit current circumstances. They operate as discreet messages that reinforce the credibility of strategic narratives. Relevant to immediate situations and tied to specific events, tactical narratives are time-sensitive and often quickly forgotten when circumstances change. Some effectively function as sub-narratives within the larger strategic ones.

The analysis of tactical narratives from March to November 2024 demonstrates that several narratives consistently ranked among the top ones, namely:

• “Belarus is a social welfare state, a country for life, for ordinary people” (this narrative diverts attention from political issues toward basic needs).
• “Belarus is not an aggressor. Minsk supports peace and dialogue in foreign policy” (a narrative reframing Belarus’s role in the war against Ukraine to downplay its co-aggressor image).
• “Łukašenka maintains order and keeps everything under control” (portraying the leader as a guarantor of stability).

The narrative of successful cooperation with the East and the Global South also remained prominent. However, it shifted. Early on, such partnerships were framed as a replacement for the West, but by year’s end, the emphasis turned to complementarity and not replacement, to success through new alliances. The most recurring narratives focused on the country’s internal stability and social policy.

The war in Ukraine was regularly described through the following narratives:

• “The aggressive neo-colonial West is unsuccessfully trying to maintain its hegemony”.
• “The West is to blame for the war in Ukraine and continues to fuel it”.

The “Belarus conquers space” narrative, popular in the spring, disappeared from the top in August, giving way to other achievements. Similarly, the narratives “Belarus is a democratic state governed by the rule of law” and “The state guarantees sovereignty and independence” fell out of the top 30 after July.

However, the narrative discrediting protests and dissent grew stronger toward the end of the year, likely due to preparations for the 2025 presidential “election”. Praise for state officials also disappeared in July, coinciding with the diversification and intensification of narratives glorifying Łukašenka. Early in the year, Łukašenka was portrayed as a leader who routinely kept order in the country. As time passed, he was elevated to the status of a saviour, Baćka (a father figure), an experienced politician who foretells the future and is key to the nation’s success.

Belarusian state propaganda’s worldview in 2024

The goal of state-sponsored media is to shape a distorted perception of reality among the target audiences in a way that benefits the ruling regime. The primary target audience of state media consists of citizens loyal or neutral to the authorities in Belarus. The secondary audience includes dissenters (who may not watch TV directly but are exposed to the intended narratives through alternative channels, including some non-state media) and international audiences.

A summary of the worldview promoted by state media reveals the following core narratives:

• Belarus is a stable and peace-loving state where the nation is united, the economy is developing, and the authorities care for citizens.
• The West is a source of pressure, hybrid threats, sanctions, military aggression, and injustice, engaging in unfair practices in politics, the economy, and international conflicts.
• Russia is a strategic ally and brotherly nation whose support enables Belarus to withstand external challenges.
• The future lies with the East and the Global South; the world is changing, and Belarus holds an essential place despite external pressure.

The relevance of narratives varies depending on the target audiences. Loyal audiences are primarily reassured in their beliefs that Belarus is a social state and a great country to live in and that Łukašenka is an excellent leader. Uninvolved or politically disengaged audiences receive pragmatic messaging: the Łukašenka regime keeps Belarusians from being dragged into Russia’s war against Ukraine and ensures growing prosperity. Dissenters are targeted with messages that the protest has failed, its leaders are immoral and broken, resistance is futile, and punishment is inevitable. International audiences are told that Belarus supports peace in Ukraine, favours dialogue in foreign policy and maintains sovereignty.

Below, we present a more detailed depiction of this worldview. We have highlighted the key messages for different segments of the target audiences in distinct colours: green for politically disengaged Belarusians, orange for dissenters, and blue for the international audience. The main body of narratives intended for loyal supporters is left unmarked.

Belarus as a besieged fortress of stability and order

Belarus is a sovereign, social, and democratic state, a country for life where the authorities care for citizens. The state develops the economy, supports culture and sports, and ensures law and order. Belarus honours historical truth, particularly the memory of the Great Patriotic War, and will not allow it to be distorted.

The nation of Belarus is united, but this unity must be maintained as the country faces external threats. The West, engaged in an information and hybrid war, hates Belarus and seeks to destabilise it with sanctions. Nonetheless, the state successfully copes with economic challenges and responds to those threats.

Łukašenka is a wise and experienced politician who saved the country from chaos and war and continues to control the situation. His personal contacts play a crucial role in international politics; he attracts interest from global media, and his predictions come true. Only the Belarusian authorities tell the truth and protect the nation from disinformation.

Amoral opposition traitors and defeated protestors have ended up as fools and lost their struggle. They are incapable of reigniting it and will inevitably be punished. In the meantime, they are hiding abroad and are forced to suffer in dire conditions as exiles, treated as second-class citizens by neo-Nazi states.

External threats and the fight for a place in the world

Belarus is not an aggressor. On the contrary, Minsk advocates for peace and dialogue across the globe. However, it faces hostility from the West, which supports the war in Ukraine and pressures Belarus with sanctions. Western leaders are puppets of the United States, acting against the interests of their people.

At the same time, Ukraine is the actual aggressor, fuelling the war and posing a threat to Belarus. However, Kyiv is not the only one to blame for conflicts. The West, in general, pursues an unjust policy. In the Middle East, the West supports Israel, which is the real aggressor, not Palestine.

The West is also to blame for the migration crisis, acting undemocratically and inhumanely as it refuses to accept migrants in violation of its own human rights principles.

Geopolitical transformation and the union with Russia

The world is undergoing a power shift with growing global instability. The geopolitical centre is moving toward the East and the Global South. Belarus has successfully found its place in this emerging world order by strengthening its ties with Russia and other nations.

Belarus and Russia are brotherly nations who see their alliance growing stronger. Eurasian integration is progressing, and the Minsk-Moscow partnership can stand up to the West. Russia shares its latest technologies with Belarus, while regional cooperation yields positive results.

It is not all that hopeless in the West, as some politicians are pursuing the “right” course. For instance, support for Donald Trump in Minsk highlights a hope for changes in the U.S. that may ease pressure on Belarus.

The future of Belarus

To preserve the country, it is necessary to develop the economy, maintain social stability, and prevent the rewriting of history. The government pays special attention to improving the demographic situation as the country must care for the next generation.

The state will continue to develop its domestic policy, ensure security and stability, and protect the interests of its citizens despite external threats. The key priority is to prevent Western influence and safeguard the Belarusian development path.

According to the Chatham House research conducted between December 2024 and January 2025, Alaksandr Łukašenka has shaped a favourable image of himself as a leader trying to prevent Belarus from being drawn into a military conflict. This stance resonates with anti-war sentiment among Belarusians. However, he enjoys unconditional support only from a distinctly pro-government audience segment. Chatham House data indicates that 33 per cent of Belarusians identify as pro-government, 41 per cent as neutral (defined by Chatham House as those largely disengaged from politics), 13 per cent as economically dissatisfied, and 14 per cent as pro-democratic. At the same time, 36 per cent of Belarusians fully agree, and another 32 per cent somewhat agree, that Łukašenka is doing everything he can to keep Belarus out of war (totalling 68 per cent). In contrast, 6 per cent strongly disagree, and 5 per cent somewhat disagree with this statement (totalling 11 per cent).

Meanwhile, public satisfaction with the country’s current state remains low (18 per cent). Belarusians express discontent over the economic situation, corruption, migration policy, and the direction of the government’s domestic and foreign policies.

Most Belarusians support an eventual political “thaw” that could follow the elections, including improved relations with the West and the easing of repressive measures. Even pro-government groups endorse this, believing that Belarus has traditionally been open to international cooperation and that repressive measures, in their view, have already been minimised. Nevertheless, despite this support, Belarusians do not expect any such “thaw” to occur.

In summary, propaganda succeeded in portraying Łukašenka’s regime as the one attempting to shield the country from war despite the militarisation of official discourse. However, the authorities were only marginally successful in convincing the public of the country’s prosperity or fostering hatred toward the West.

3. Information distribution channels

3.1. Condition of information infrastructure

Technical infrastructure

In 2024, Belarus’s information infrastructure showed contradictory developments. On the one hand, there was a high penetration rate of basic telecommunications services. According to the data from the Ministry of Communications and Informatisation, by early 2025, there were 11.875 million mobile subscribers in the country, 118,000 more than the previous year, which equals 129.7 subscribers per 100 inhabitants (+2.5 percentage points). By the end of 2024, LTE mobile network coverage reached 99 per cent of the population.

The external internet bandwidth was increased by 590 Gbps, reaching 4,220 Gbps as of 1 January 2025. The rollout of passive optical network (GPON) technology continued, providing data transmission speed of 100 Mbps and higher. The number of GPON users grew by 99,300 to 3.053 million. In total, fixed broadband internet subscribers amounted to 3.292 million.

On the other hand, the adoption of advanced technologies, particularly 5G, lagged behind the neighbouring countries. Only on 1 April 2025, the government approved an investment project for deploying IMT-2020 (5G) mobile communication networks “under a single infrastructure operator model”, which also includes an integrated LTE (4G) mobile network. This project is planned for 2025-2035, indicating the long-term transition to new technologies. The designated infrastructure operator is Belarusian Cloud Technologies LLC, with the Operational and Analytical Centre under the President of Belarus tasked with overseeing the project.

DataReportal (January 2024) shows that 89.5 per cent of Belarus’s 9.48 million residents are internet users. The number of mobile connections exceeds the population size (120.5%).

Internet infrastructure is monitored using Sandvine’s deep packet inspection (DPI) technology, which enables internet traffic analysis and filtering. Experts note that the sanctions and reliance on foreign equipment cause a relative delay in tech development.

Access to technology

Despite high internet penetration, access to technology in Belarus remains uneven. Active social media users number 5.63 million or 59.4 per cent of the population, reflecting a year-on-year increase of +31.8 per cent. Among platforms, YouTube leads with 6 million monthly users, followed by Viber (5.5 million), TikTok (between 4.27 and 5 million), and Instagram (between 3 and 3.9 million). VKontakte and Odnoklassniki each have between 2.2 and 2.8 million users, while Telegram reaches an audience of around 1.5 million.

However, access to tools for circumvention of internet censorship, such as VPNs, is increasingly risky due to legislation aimed at “countering extremism”. Users in rural areas and the older generation are particularly vulnerable, often lacking the skills to bypass technical barriers safely.

Restrictions and barriers

In 2024, the Belarusian government significantly tightened control over the national information infrastructure:

• On 27 January 2025, a ban was introduced on accessing Belarusian websites from abroad.
• On 10 January, there was a seven-hour internet outage, officially attributed to “technical maintenance”; shutdowns are estimated to cost around $7 million.
• On 31 December of both 2023 and 2024, YouTube was deliberately throttled during the New Year’s address by the leader of the democratic forces, Sviatłana Cichanoŭskaja.
• According to the Minister of Information Marat Markaŭ, by September 2024, approximately 14,000 online resources had been blocked, over 5,000 of which were labelled as “extremist content”.
• Authorities started revoking domain names of websites included in the national registry of extremist materials.

3.2. Accessibility of various channels

Traditional media

In 2024, traditional media in Belarus remained fully state controlled. Nearly all independent print outlets covering socio-political issues ceased operations. At the same time, the few surviving ones functioned under heavy self-censorship, constrained by the risk of being designated as “extremist” and subjected to criminal prosecution.

Digital platforms

Digital platforms remain the primary space for disseminating independent information, but their usage entails growing risks. Telegram, YouTube, and TikTok are the most influential social media for distributing alternative content.

Telegram remains one of the key platforms for independent media in exile.

Despite occasional slowdowns, YouTube plays a vital role in delivering video content.
With 5.63 million users (74.2 per cent of the adult population), TikTok has emerged as the most impactful platform, particularly among younger audiences.

However, digital risks are increasing. In 2024, Belarus recorded its first-ever criminal cases for a single repost from so-called “extremist” sources, significantly deterring digital engagement and user activity.

Alternative channels

Independent media are developing alternative ways to distribute information amid tight censorship and repression. A key initiative is Belarus Tomorrow, the first ecosystem-based public TV broadcasting project providing a shared satellite platform for independent video content producers.

Informal channels also play a significant role. Content circulates through messaging apps, local group chats, and word-of-mouth, enabling users to bypass digital surveillance. However, these methods are constrained by limited reach and difficulty verifying information.

As a result, Belarus’s information infrastructure is increasingly fragmented, with parallel media realities emerging for different audience segments. This deepens information silos and undermines the potential for public dialogue and a shared understanding of relevant national contexts.

4. Thematic analysis of key events

4.1. Coverage of elections and political processes

In 2024 and 2025, the media coverage of the Belarusian presidential campaign demonstrated unprecedented polarization. Both state-run and independent outlets constructed parallel narrative ecosystems, presenting sharply conflicting interpretations of the same political developments. The research by Media IQ pointed out the intensifying divide, documenting its progression from the campaign’s onset to the announcement of the election results.

As the electoral campaign unofficially kicked off in the autumn of 2024, state-run media emphasized the idea of “electoral sovereignty”, dismissing international norms in favour of a «homegrown electoral model» with the rallying cry “We will shape our destiny without foreign interference”. However, by January 2025, coverage shifted away from this abstract concept (mentions dropped from 4.6 per cent down to 1.11 per cent) toward more tangible narratives, such as “well-organised elections” (6.31 per cent), international support for the electoral process (3.91 per cent), and the importance of high voter turnout (3.71 per cent).

The campaign’s rhetoric was increasingly militarised, portraying voting as defending national stability amid external threats. State TV channels reinforced the narrative of Belarus as “an island of peace and stability” (2.16 per cent), contrasting the “quiet Belarus” with “the chaos in other countries”. The electoral commission was depicted as a guarantor of this stability, with the electoral process framed as a natural continuation of internal consolidation.

Central Election Commission’s head, Ihar Karpienka, became the campaign’s public face, accounting for 43.08 per cent of all direct media citations in January 2025. President Alaksandr Łukašenka’s media presence also surged in the final campaign phase, with his mentions doubling and citations tripling compared to December (up to 40.93 per cent of all media mentions). This marked a strategic transition in the informational strategy from technical coverage of the process to personalising the victory.

Independent media consistently deconstructed the campaign’s notion of legitimacy. In January 2025, criticism of the undemocratic process became the primary narrative, peaking at 8.7 per cent of all mentions. Media coverage emphasised the lack of genuine competition, limited access to alternative candidates, and the merely ceremonial nature of campaigning. Reports of repression also increased in the independent media from 3.8 per cent in December 2024 to 5.3 per cent in January, reflecting the intensified pressure on citizens during voting.

Independent outlets adopted specific terminology: elections were put in quotation marks or labelled as “pseudo-elections”, “non-elections”, or “fake elections”. Media IQ noted that some outlets used standard disclaimers asserting the campaign’s undemocratic nature, treating it as a factual rather than a subjective description.

The political decisions surrounding the campaign were also reported in starkly different ways. State-sponsored media focused on the organisational aspects, portraying the election process as technologically advanced and transparent. At the same time, they deliberately ignored any mention of potential violations. The narrative “Belarusian elections are well-organised” ranked first in state-run media (6.31 per cent).

Independent sources, by contrast, highlighted legislative changes that tightened control over the electoral system and examined the institutional backdrop of the campaign, from the use of “electoral filters” to the exclusion of potential competitors during the registration phase. One of the key narratives in the independent media space was “electoral ritual instead of real elections” (3.22 per cent).

Another important topic was the issue of international recognition of the election results. State media emphasised support from “friendly” nations and organisations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (3.91 per cent), carefully avoiding any mentions of the OSCE/ODIHR’s absence or criticism from Western countries. In contrast, independent media focused on the lack of recognition of the elections by democratic countries (4.91 per cent), underscoring that “even compared to 2020, the number of world leaders willing to endorse Łukašenka’s legitimacy has declined”.

Following the vote count, contrasting narratives intensified. State-sponsored outlets promoted Łukašenka’s “convincing victory” (0.98 per cent) and the election as “proof of policy success” (3.05 per cent). Independent media focused on “election fraud” (0.52 per cent) and “fabricated results”. Media IQ noted a deliberate parallel drawn by independent media between Łukašenka’s official result (86.82 per cent) and Vladimir Putin’s 2024 figure (87.28 per cent) to highlight authoritarian electoral patterns.

Public reaction mirrored the divided media environment. Official rhetoric framed the election as a “celebration of national unity” with stories of high turnout and patriotic enthusiasm. State media pushed the message of “election as a unifying force” (1.87 per cent), portraying a content, supportive citizenry that fully backs the president’s policies.

At the same time, independent media and Telegram channels reported on a sense of alienation from the electoral process among a significant portion of the population. One could observe a widespread scepticism, especially in urban areas, where, against the backdrop of repression and declining economic expectations, people perceived the elections as a “prearranged performance”, an imitation of a political process, not as a genuine mechanism for choosing leadership, but as a ritual demonstrating the regime’s fictitious legitimacy and control. Unsurprisingly, independent media had a significantly greater resonance in the online space. According to Media IQ’s electoral monitoring of YouTube channels, the independent outlet Malanka Media garnered 2.42 million views in January 2025, or nearly double that of the closest state-run competitor, STV (1.23 million). Moreover, independent media’s engagement rate (likes and comments relative to views) was noticeably higher.

Thus, the 2025 presidential campaign, despite its formal significance, rather became an instrument of political ritualisation and symbolic control than a genuine mechanism of public choice. The stark contrast in state and independent media coverage reinforced the existence of “two parallel information realities,” which rarely intersect in their interpretations of political developments in Belarus.

4.2. Economic issues

In 2024, the portrayal of economic issues in Belarusian media revealed a pronounced division in the information sphere, with state-run and independent outlets offering fundamentally different perspectives on the economic landscape.

In the official discourse, the economic situation was portrayed as a success story in the face of external challenges. State-sponsored media consistently painted a picture of growth, emphasising positive GDP dynamics and the financial system’s stability. Official reports projected confidence in the correctness of the economic course and the effectiveness of anti-crisis measures.

When covering the economy, state media ignored the rise of the U.S. dollar against the Belarusian ruble. They downplayed sanctions and their causes while recommending holiday travel to Russia, Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine, Turkey, or domestic destinations. They glorified Łukašenka, highlighting stories of reviving the Chernobyl accident-affected lands.

Independent outlets, by contrast, presented a fundamentally different picture. Economic experts noted that growth indicators were largely driven by administrative measures, while real household incomes showed no significant improvement. Analysts pointed to structural imbalances in the economy: declining profitability in industrial enterprises, a growing state budget deficit, and high debt levels in the real sector. Notably, the most critical economic analysis was published outside the country, reflecting the ongoing shrinking space for an open economic debate within Belarus.

The sanctions and their consequences remained central in the economic media discourse. International restrictions targeting key sectors of the Belarusian economy, from the potash industry to the military-industrial complex, created a new economic reality requiring adaptation. State-run media downplayed the adverse effects of sanctions, instead framing them as an opportunity to promote import substitution and market diversification.

Notably, state-sponsored outlets consistently avoided directly discussing the sanctions or their causes, especially in their coverage of everyday issues. For example, in travel-related stories, they recommended holidaymaking in Russia, Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine, Turkey, or domestically while avoiding mentioning why traditional European destinations had become less accessible. One illustrative case was the coverage of the EU’s ban on second-hand clothing exports to Belarus, with state media criticising the “cruel West” but omitting both the context of sanctions and the underlying economic reasons for the popularity of second-hand clothing in the country.

On the other hand, independent analysts examined in detail the Belarusian government’s efforts to circumvent sanctions, which ranged from complex schemes involving offshore companies to rerouting trade through third countries. Economists noted that while those efforts provided some relief, they only partially offset the broader impact of sanctions. Over time, the long-term structural constraints will become increasingly significant for the entire economy.

In 2024, integration processes, particularly deeper cooperation with Russia and other Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) countries, were prominent in Belarus’s economic narrative. State-sponsored media portrayed integration as a strategic choice providing access to markets, investment, and energy resources amidst Western sanctions. Special emphasis was placed on joint industry, energy, and transport infrastructure projects as evidence of mutually beneficial partnerships.

A telling example of manipulative coverage of technological achievements was the spring media campaign hailing Belarus as a “space power” following the spaceflight of tourist Maryna Vasileŭskaja to the Russian segment of the International Space Station. However, by the end of the year, this topic had vanished entirely from the information space, with no follow-up in the form of economic or technological projects.

Independent experts viewed integration processes through the lens of economic sovereignty. Their publications raised concerns about Belarus’s growing dependence on Russian capital, the unequal nature of economic ties, and structural risks to the national economy. A notable theme was the critical analysis of the gap between official rhetoric about the benefits of integration and the lack of tangible improvement in the country’s socio-economic conditions.

Overall, the 2024 economic agenda in Belarusian media reflected a systemic divide between the official version of economic reality and the independent analysis. This contradiction went beyond routine differences in interpretation, pointing to a fundamental disconnect in understanding economic processes and development prospects. Limited access to objective economic data and the predictability of the state narrative only deepened polarisation, creating parallel economic realities for different audiences.

4.3. Social issues

The theme of social welfare is heavily exploited by state propaganda. Throughout 2024, the narrative «Belarus is a social state, a country for life, for ordinary people» consistently ranked among the top three narratives in state-sponsored media. Authorities were praised for routine administrative deeds, such as turning on the central heating according to schedule, which is an obligation of the state, not a favour. Achievements in the healthcare sector were another popular topic emphasising the «free» nature of medical services. In this way, state media used social policy to legitimise the Łukašenka regime.

The topic of LGBTQ+ rights was traditionally employed by state propaganda to incite hatred toward the West and deepen social divides, positioning the regime as the defender of “traditional values”. One example was the Eurovision Song Contest in May, where the winner, a non-binary performer named Nemo, was vilified by state media, which used hate speech and referred to the show as a «freak circus» that worships «evil forces». Earlier in April, the authorities proposed criminalising the depiction of LGBTQ+, equating it with pornography and classifying it alongside bestiality, necrophilia, and sadism.

5. Transformational impact of media

5.1. Impact of investigative journalism

Prominent investigations

Despite harsh working conditions and increasing pressure from authorities, Belarusian independent media continue to produce high-impact investigations, upholding strong journalistic standards and actively collaborating with international organisations such as the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ). In 2024, some of the most notable investigations came from outlets like the Belarusian Investigative Centre (BIC, InvestigateBel), BuroMedia, and Reform.news, though other media also ran significant investigative stories.

One major investigation by BIC, in collaboration with international partners, uncovered the existence of a secret filtration camp in the Belarusian town of Naroŭla. Russian forces were found to have illegally detained Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilians there, having forcibly deported them from Ukraine following the full-scale invasion by Russia. Using satellite imagery, video footage, and testimony from former detainees, journalists convincingly documented severe violations of international humanitarian law.

Another important BIC investigation focused on the Belarusian businessman Viktar Šaŭcoŭ who has ties to Alaksandr Łukašenka’s inner circle. The journalists revealed a sanctions evasion scheme involving the Hungarian company PS Commodities Kft, owned by Šaŭcoŭ. Following publication, the Central District Court of Budapest ordered the company’s liquidation: a striking example of the international impact of Belarusian investigative journalism.

Additionally, BIC exposed illegal schemes to supply Western microchips to Russia via Belarusian intermediaries. The report drew international attention and prompted EU-level discussions on tightening sanctions to stop such shipments. BIC also published “The Price of a Visit to Abkhazia,” an investigation into connections between Belarusian officials and businessmen and the authorities of the separatist region of Abkhazia, raising questions about breaches of international law and the EU’s sanctions regime.

The BuroMedia team also conducted a series of high-profile investigations, including the “Bloody Middlemen” report. Journalists exposed illegal schemes involving the supply of European industrial equipment to the Russian military-industrial complex via Belarusian intermediaries. Another investigation, “Truck Dealers”, uncovered how European trucks were delivered to Russia through the Belarusian companies Avtobai and NMP Logistic. Those revelations prompted responses from the EU law enforcement agencies and led to legal consequences for the companies involved.

A powerful public reaction followed a publication by Reform.news, which revealed that the labour of Belarusian political prisoners was used at an agricultural enterprise near Lida owned by Jörg Dornau, a member of Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. The report generated significant discussion in the German media and prompted a preliminary investigation by the public prosecutor’s office in the German state of Saxony.

These examples represent just a portion of the robust investigative journalism actively pursued by the Belarusian independent media outlets.

Public resonance

Despite limited access to the domestic audience due to repression and internet blocks, investigations by Belarusian independent media continue to have a significant international impact. Reports on sanctions violations, the use of political prisoners for labour, and crimes against humanity are discussed in the parliaments of European countries and within international human rights organisations.

These investigations help draw global attention to the situation in Belarus and trigger legal and political responses on an international level, including court proceedings and new sanctions.

Consequences of publications

A distinct feature of Belarusian investigative journalism is that its findings are often ignored by the country’s authorities but have substantial consequences abroad. The dissolution of the Hungarian company owned by Belarusian businessman Viktar Šaŭcoŭ and the launch of an investigation in Germany into Jörg Dornau’s case demonstrates the tangible impact of these publications.

Human rights defenders also note that the materials produced by Belarusian investigative journalists could serve as evidence in future international legal proceedings, including potential cases before the International Criminal Court. Thus, even under repression and with limited resources, investigative journalism in Belarus remains vital for international accountability and for bringing perpetrators of legal and human rights violations to justice.

5.2. The role of media in societal processes

The ecosystem of Belarusian independent media in exile performs functions far beyond mere news delivery. It has become a vital force for democratisation, public safety, and the preservation of national identity.

Shaping public opinion

In the face of relentless government crackdowns, independent media in Belarus still play an essential role in guiding public sentiment throughout the country. Various surveys from 2024 indicate that from one-fourth to 39 per cent of Belarusians regularly access these outlets. Thus, a substantial portion of the population still seeks alternative information despite censorship and the risk of criminal persecution.

Independent media are especially influential in shaping public attitudes toward Russia’s war against Ukraine. Studies reveal a strong link between independent media consumption and opposition to the war: 94 per cent of their audiences are critical of the conflict, compared to 61 per cent of regular state media consumers who fully or partially support Russian aggression.

Independent media create an information space grounded in democratic values and international law, helping many Belarusians maintain critical thinking and remain resilient to state propaganda. In 2024, their coverage focused mainly on social issues and the war in Ukraine, reflecting a consistent effort to connect global developments to Belarus’s national interests.

Independent media also function as a public oversight mechanism, curbing government excess and compelling authorities to account for public reaction, particularly on issues likely to generate domestic or international attention.

Social transformations

The preservation of Belarusian identity and culture heavily relies on independent media, which is essential given the ongoing policies of Russification and the growing integration with Russia. The share of outlets covering cultural content rose from 68 per cent in 2024 to 72 per cent in early 2025, reflecting sustained public interest in identity issues and similar global trends of growing news fatigue.

Although 97 per cent of Belarusian independent media use the Belarusian language, only 29 per cent of their content is produced or translated into Belarusian. Still, even this limited content represents a meaningful alternative to state-led Russification. For example, in the education system, only 9 per cent of children receive instruction in Belarusian, a sharp decline from 40 per cent in 1994.

By supporting the Belarusian language and culture, independent media help safeguard national sovereignty and the right to self-determination. Their practical use of Belarusian serves as a quiet form of resistance to the norms imposed by the Belarusian regime. Moreover, a strong sense of Belarusian identity is a natural barrier to the spread of the “Russian world” ideology and narratives of unity among Russian-speaking nations.

Belarusian independent media provide a unique perspective on global events rooted in the national context. For example, during the Munich Security Conference in February 2025, while Russian exiled media spotlighted Yulia Navalnaya, Belarusian outlets focused on speeches by United Transitional Cabinet leaders Sviatłana Cichanoŭskaja and Vadzim Kabančuk. This illustrates why Russian counterparts cannot replace Belarusian media, as that would erode the sense of political agency and national self-determination of the Belarusian nation.

Unlike in Russia, where independent media reach only from 3.7 to 7 per cent of the population and have limited influence on public opinion, Belarusian independent media continue shaping public sentiment and driving long-term social change despite years of repression and exile.

Thus, Belarusian independent media are not merely sources of information. They catalyse social transformation, preserving democratic values, national identity, and critical thinking amidst authoritarian pressure.

6. Forecast for 2025

6.1. Projected developments in information policy

In 2025, the information policy of Belarus’s ruling regime is expected to institutionalise censorship further, centralise control, and construct a «sovereign» information space. With Alaksandr Łukašenka maintaining a firm grip on power amid deteriorating regional security, the authorities are likely to pursue even tighter control and increased isolation of the media landscape.

Legislative changes

Following the 2024 crackdowns that included criminal liability for reposting, likes, and subscriptions to «extremist» content, further restrictions are likely. These may consist of expanding the definition of “facilitating extremism”, banning anonymous circumvention tools (e.g., VPNs, TOR), and introducing a mandatory “blogger registry” and regulation of platforms that provide access to content beyond national jurisdiction.

Technological trends

Digital modernisation will serve as a tool of control, not liberalisation. Authorities are expected to expand the use of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) for traffic filtering, develop state-controlled content networks (CDNs), and build infrastructure to manage information flows. The national 5G rollout will likely enhance state surveillance, while Russian-style «smart blocking» and behavioural monitoring technologies may be adopted.

Political factors

Geopolitical tensions will be leveraged to mobilise society through narratives of external threats. Whether the U.S. initiative to reconcile aggressor and victim in the Russia-Ukraine war succeeds or neighbouring countries withdraw from the Ottawa Convention and mine their borders with Belarus, such developments will be used by state media to reinforce the image of a besieged fortress. This, in turn, will justify further tightening the information regime, including creating loyal new structures like “alternative, independent” media outlets, patriotic influencers, and youth platforms.

Financial context and dependence on external funding

The funding crisis facing Belarusian independent media triggered by the termination of U.S. assistance in early 2025 has become systemic. European donors are expected to reduce support further as budgets are redirected toward defence. This will weaken the independent media sector and leave audiences increasingly vulnerable to the monopoly of state propaganda. As a result, some newsrooms may be forced to suspend operations already in 2025, retreating into “deep underground” work modes or shifting toward low-profile hybrid formats such as volunteer-led projects or anonymous Telegram channels.

Thus, 2025 is likely to solidify a durable architecture of digital authoritarianism in Belarus, where legal, technological, and political controls coexist with a superficially “stable” information environment. The media sphere will remain a key battleground of political struggle, with independent actors relying less on Western grants and more on innovation, self-organisation, and international solidarity.

6.2. Potential new narratives

Amidst intensified domestic control and mounting foreign policy pressure, Belarusian state propaganda is expected to evolve in 2025, adapting to new challenges. This shift will involve new thematic content and changes in formats and target audiences.

Emerging topics

State media will likely increase focus on military and pseudo-defence narratives. As the EU reinforces its borders, the prevailing narrative of “external threat” will be expanded to portray Belarus as encircled by “hostile regimes”, necessitating internal unity. A revival of the “new partition of Europe” theme may emerge, positioning Belarus as the bastion of the “union” world in contrast to the “chaos and decline” of Western civilisation. This contrast will be framed using familiar propaganda logic—“our guns are noble; theirs are evil”.

A return to the late-Soviet style rhetoric promoting “mobilisation economy”, “self-sufficiency”, and “import substitution” can be expected.

Shifting rhetoric 

Following a prolonged period of overt military messaging and coercive tone, state media may transition to “softer”, more adaptive communication. This could involve launching quasi-civic initiatives on platforms like TikTok, “people’s video blogs”, pseudo-debates, or superficial “dialogue forums”. Their goal will be to cultivate a loyal, seemingly spontaneous media environment, or what has been termed as “propaganda without propaganda”.

New propaganda angles

One likely focus will be the institutionalisation of a “positive agenda”. In an increasingly isolated information space, authorities will seek to showcase “success stories” as proof of the Belarusian model’s resilience and efficiency. Emotionally charged narratives will gain prominence, glorifying teachers, doctors, soldiers, and workers and their “patriotic loyalty” and “heroic labour”.

The Belarusian government will likely persist with anti-NATO messaging in the international arena, accusing Poland and Lithuania of plotting aggression while portraying itself as the region’s sole rational and peace-seeking actor. These efforts may include the creation of “alternative” global platforms, forums, and media outlets aimed at audiences in the Global South.

6.3. Risks and challenges for the media landscape

Belarus’s media landscape in 2025 faces a wide range of risks, each threatening the technical and institutional resilience of the independent media sector. These challenges go far beyond traditional threats to freedom of speech, affecting the architecture of access to information, funding sources, and the safety of media professionals.

Technological risks

The introduction of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technologies in Belarus and the systematic development of domestic internet infrastructure and centralised traffic management lay the groundwork for isolating the Belarusian internet segment from the outside world. Targeted or large-scale shutdowns of access to key news platforms are possible, particularly ahead of major political events or during heightened military tension.

Political threats

The political environment in Belarus continues to deteriorate toward total unpredictability regarding the boundaries of free speech: what is allowed today may be prohibited tomorrow. The risk of criminal prosecution for journalism remains high both for journalists operating inside the country and exiled media (through transnational repression or confiscation of property).

Economic challenges

The collapse of external funding has emerged as the most pressing issue of early 2025, with no signs of recovery. Additional cuts to European support programs for Belarus’s independent media ecosystem are anticipated.

Against this backdrop, building horizontal solidarity networks, adopting flexible operational models (e.g., remote newsrooms), developing autonomous digital platforms, and pursuing collaborative initiatives with other civic society sectors is critical.

7. Annexes

7.1. Methodology

This annual analysis of Belarus’s media landscape is based on a comprehensive application of qualitative and quantitative research methods. The core methodology employed is content analysis, specifically tailored to assess adherence to professional journalism standards.

Throughout 2024, three media categories were examined:

• State-sponsored media in Belarus
• Non-state media in Belarus
• Independent Belarusian media in exile

Monitoring spanned television channels, online outlets, and social media. A statistically valid sample of content represented each type of media. Special focus was given to prime-time television programming, which reaches the largest audience.

The study evaluated compliance with five core journalism standards:

1. Credibility
2. Completeness of information
3. Separation of facts from opinions
4. Representation of diverse viewpoints
5. Accuracy

A dedicated narrative analysis methodology was used to detect manipulation, which included:

• Identifying recurring storylines
• Tracking narrative evolution
• Analysing manipulative techniques
• Measuring the frequency of specific narratives

A team of media analysts carried out data collection. To ensure objectivity, each item was evaluated by at least two experts independently. In cases of discrepancy, additional discussions were held to reach a consensus.

The study integrated audience data from independent sociological research, including Chatham House surveys, to measure each media category’s reach and influence on public opinion.

Several research limitations were noted, including:

• Restricted access to specific in-country sources
• Limited availability of open sociological data on media consumption
• Inability to conduct in-depth interviews with state media personnel
• Challenges in measuring the actual impact of manipulation techniques on audiences

Triangulation of data sources and analytical methods was applied to mitigate these limitations. Conclusions are based on cross-verification of diverse sources and supported by specific examples from media content.

Unlike the half-year report, this full-year analysis revealed long-term trends and stable operational patterns across different types of media. This provided a more nuanced understanding of Belarus’s media environment and allowed for informed projections about its trajectory in 2025.

7.2. Glossary of terms

Key definitions

Strategic narratives are relatively consistent, internally coherent statements reflecting deeply entrenched beliefs of the ruling regime’s leadership. Forming the backbone of information campaigns, they are designed to exert long-term influence on public opinion.

Tactical narratives develop the worldview set by strategic narratives, adapting it to current events. They act as standalone messages that reinforce the credibility of strategic narratives. Relevant to immediate situations and tied to events, tactical narratives are time-sensitive and often quickly forgotten when circumstances change.

Independent media are outlets free from government, political, and corporate influence. They prioritise public interest and democratic values and adhere to high ethical and professional standards. In the context of Belarus, independent media are characterised by a Belarus-centred approach—focusing on issues relevant to the country and its people.

Exiled media outlets operate outside their home country due to political persecution, security threats, or restrictions on freedom of speech. The primary goal of such media is to maintain an informational connection with audiences in their homeland, support freedom of expression, and promote democratic values. Unlike diaspora media, which focus on preserving cultural identity, exiled media prioritise reporting current events in the home country and advocating for human rights.

State-sponsored media are owned and funded by the government, reflecting the official stance of the authorities.

«Extremist formations» is a legal term in Belarusian law referring to a group of individuals involved in, supporting, endorsing, or financing extremist activity and recognised as such by the Ministry of Internal Affairs or the State Security Committee. This label is frequently applied to independent media and human rights organisations, exposing their staff and audiences to potential criminal prosecution.

«Extremist organisation» is an entity that engages in extremist activities, supports them in any form, acknowledges the possibility of such activities in its operations, or finances them—and has been officially designated as extremist by a court ruling that has entered into legal force. Unlike an “extremist formation”, this designation can only be issued by a court.

«Extremist materials» are symbols and insignia, informational products (including printed, audio, audiovisual, and other messages and/or materials, posters, portraits, banners, visual slogans, advertising products) intended for public display, distribution, or other use for such purposes—or already distributed by any means—whose content promotes or incites extremist activity. The creation and dissemination of such content are subject to administrative penalties, serving as a censorship tool and limiting public access to independent information. This status can only be assigned by a court.

Content analysis is a method for analysing texts and documents that allows for the systematisation of content and the identification of patterns in the use of linguistic and thematic elements. It includes quantitative and qualitative data assessment for further interpretation in line with research questions.

Propaganda is a systematic information and communication activity to spread ideology, ideas, or opinions to control thought and behaviour and influence the target audience’s attitude toward a particular idea or group. It often employs manipulative techniques and disinformation to shape public perceptions and emotions.

The information space is the entire ecosystem of channels, content, and processes involved in distributing and consuming information within a social group or a state.

Parallel media realities mean a condition where different segments of society receive fundamentally different accounts of current events, leading to incompatible worldviews.

Selective reporting is a manipulation technique in which only selected facts are presented to the audience, creating a distorted perception of an event or phenomenon.

Framing is a manipulative technique in which the audience’s attention is deliberately diverted from essential aspects to secondary ones, distorting the perceived importance of different information elements.

Substitution of concepts is a manipulation tactic where one concept is replaced by another, distorting the true nature of a phenomenon

Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) is a technology for analysing and filtering internet traffic used to control information flow on the network.