“Let’s Hit Poland”: How Russian Media Covered the “Zapad-2025” Drills

Kots is one of Russia’s most famous war bloggers with over half a million followers. Rzeszów, a Polish city, plays a central role in Western arms deliveries to Ukraine. Though rhetorical, the fact that a channel with half a million followers can openly call for an attack on Poland shows how far Russian propaganda actors can go.

To understand narratives about “Zapad-2025” spread in Russia, Media IQ in cooperation with Re:Baltica analyzed coverage across Russian mass media and “Telegram” channels from September 1–16, 2025 — including news agencies (TASS, RIA Novosti, Interfax), print media (Izvestia, Kommersant, Vedomosti, RBC), military Zvezda TV channel, and over 55 “Telegram“ channels — from official to radical.

Three-tier propaganda system: official outlets (TASS, RIA Novosti) set the official frame; semi-independent media and “Z” Telegram channels reinforced it with limited criticism; fringe channels radicalized the message

The Core: Official State Position

At the center stand state agencies and official outlets. TASS, RIA Novosti, and the Ministry of Defense’s TV channel transmit the government’s stance verbatim. Their tone is neutral; the content represents Moscow’s official line.

On September 10, TASS quoted Federation Council deputy chair Vladimir Dzhabarov on Rossiya-24 TV: “Poland risks facing serious consequences” after the country decided to close its border during the drills. This is not a blogger but an official threat couched in diplomatic language.

RIA Novosti on August 13 emphasized transparency: “Minsk invited international observers to Zapad-2025; invitations sent to all 56 OSCE members.”

Yet on August 8, the same RIA Novosti spread a conspiracy: “Ukraine and Poland will try to disrupt the exercises, says a source.” Anonymous sources, concrete accusations, and fear creation.

The core’s purpose is establishing the frame that others will fill and amplify.

The Second Circle: Controlled Critics

This layer includes semi-independent media — Komsomolskaya Pravda, Izvestia, Kommersant, RBC — and prominent “Telegram” bloggers like Rybar, Военный Осведомитель (milinfolive), and sashakot. These can allow minor criticism (5–10% of content) while supporting the regime overall.

For instance, Izvestia (Sept 17) published the story “Flanks Lifted: Why NATO Reacts Nervously to Zapad-2025.” Despite analytical pretenses, it framed the West as panicking. The narrative: Russian-Belarusian drills scared European leaders and exposed EU–US divisions.

Kommersant (Sept 16) headlined “The Enemy Defeated, Victory Is Ours”. In its description exercises turned into a heroic epic projecting technical superiority and readiness. The exercises were presented not as routine maneuvers, but as the transfer of combat experience — a direct link between the war in Ukraine and preparations for a possible conflict with NATO.

Even reassurance about nuclear — “strictly training context” — subtly reminded readers that Russia has atomic weapons.

Telegram channels like Военный Осведомитель criticized use of “Su-32” planes and obsolete BMD-2 vehicles. “According to the Ministry of Defense, the training used combat experience gained during the ‘special operation.’ Apparently, the same experience from the first months of 2022, when several Su-34 aircraft were lost after being sent head-on into Ukraine’s air defense systems, and many pilots were killed or captured,” it wrote another day.

The purpose of the limited criticism is the impression that bloggers are insiders and tell the “trench truth” in contrast to bureaucratic generals. It is creating an illusion of pluralism while still promoting military recruitment for Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The Periphery: Zealots and Radicals

Smaller “Telegram” channels, often run by true believers in Kremlin ideology, employ emotional and violent rhetoric.

Example: zeleniy_krai (Sept 5): “That Polish clown Tusk threatens Belarus with ‘special measures’ — NATO has held 14 drills near our borders since January!”

Sept 13: “Don’t make our Iskanders laugh! Poles saw missiles 100 meters from their border and ran crying to NATO.”

The role of these channels is to  radicalize the audience and create an emotional backdrop. When fringe voices call to attack Poland, the official media’s “defensive stance” seems moderate by comparison.

The differences between these levels are not accidental, but are deliberate strategies. Broadcasting the same fact across different levels and tones makes it possible to reach as many people as possible — from those who trust official information to those searching for an “alternative point of view.”

Propaganda dynamics: emotional intensity grew in four stages — from cautious testing to aggressive hysteria — peaking with Putin’s visit to the training ground

The campaign in Russian media unfolded in four phases.

First was in a testing phase with a restrained tone and looking at the audience’s response.

On Sept 4, espionage stories appeared — e.g., SIL0VIKI reposted from Белорусский силовик about “a Polish spy caught gathering info on Zapad-2025.”Abstract talk about “Western provocations” materialized in the figure of a specific “Polish spy.” For the growing tension — “the Motherland is in danger, the enemy is at the gates” — a “proof” was found. The channel RVvoenkor immediately added: “This is not the first case of espionage from the Polish side.”

Second phase can be characterized as  explosive aggression.  Poland’s decision to close its border on Sept 12 triggered outrage. The media framed it as “Poland panics → provokes → blames Russia → follows NATO orders.”

The third phase was full of technical descriptions with controlled critique. Outlets like Vedomosti and Interfax focused on operational details. Semi-independent “Telegram” channels added mild criticism of outdated gear or Belarusian defense.

Sept 16 was the final phase with an emotional climax. Putin’s visit to the Mulino range dominated coverage. State TV showed a 10-minute segment; Telegram exploded. In one of the channels, the Kremlin’s video stating the equipment numbers gained 1.65 million views.

Almost all of the analyzed “Telegram” channels emphasized Putin’s uniform. Significantly, on September 16, practically all channels and media simultaneously repeated the figure mentioned by Putin — “100,000 soldiers.” This number appeared 47 times across various sources within a single day, turning an approximate estimate into an “undeniable fact.”

Key narratives: deterrence through nuclear power, NATO aggression, Ukraine as provocateur, Russian technological superiority

1. Demonstration of allied strength: Russia–Belarus unity and readiness.
2. Nuclear deterrence: framed as defensive, implying threats.
3. NATO as aggressor: NATO drills = war prep; Russian drills = defense.
4. Ukraine as provocateur: blamed for regional instability.
5. Technological superiority.
6. Exercises as cover: suggesting — without denying — they could mask a new offensive, sustaining uncertainty as psychological deterrence.

Contrast with Belarus: Belarusian state media maintained diplomatic, “peaceful” rhetoric, while Russian channels were explicitly confrontational, using nuclear themes and war aesthetics

Belarusian state media projected diplomatic restraint — “peace,” “defense,” and avoidance of naming target countries. Russian outlets went in another direction.

A striking difference was the treatment of nuclear weapons: Belarus spoke of “deterrence,” while Russian media normalized discussion of potential use — gradually “warming up” public acceptance.

Thus, Belarusian outlets acted as “good cops” — diplomatic and peace-loving — while Russian “Telegram” channels played “bad cops”, saying what official media would not.

Analysis of Belarusian media coverage can be read here.

Translated from Russian and edited by Sanita Jemberga, Re:Baltica

Illustrations Miko Rode

Technical support Madara Eihe

Full versions of report in Russian can be found here.