From “Vultures Are Circling” to “We’re Only Defending”. How Belarusian Media Covered Exercises “Zapad‑2025” 

Belarusian state propaganda likewise had to work on several fronts at once. To the international community it had to convey a message of peacefulness and responsibility. To the domestic audience — strength and readiness to defend itself. Military enthusiasts and their supporters had to be showered with messages designed to mobilize patriotism.

To do so, the authorities used an entire ecosystem of information channels.

Our analysis of coverage of the “Zapad‑2025” military exercises shows how authoritarian propaganda assigns roles across channels. Each channel has its audience and its task in managing public sentiment. At the same time, all channels and messages are coordinated by a single center.

What did we analyze?

Media IQ, in cooperation with Re:Baltica, analyzed the content of Belarusian state media and pro‑government “Telegram” channels from July 2025 to the end of September, identifying the key narratives and how they were tailored for different audiences.

How is Belarusian propaganda built? Belarusian state media and pro-government Telegram channels worked in a coordinated ecosystem

Belarus’s propaganda machine is a clearly structured system aimed at patriotic indoctrination and supporting the course of the self‑proclaimed president, Alexander Lukashenko. “Yes, we engage in propaganda and agitation. That is natural. We promote our best achievements,” says Lukashenko.

BELTA news agency sits at the top of the hierarchy. Its task is to serve as the news conduit for international audiences. BELTA’s reports are written in a dry, procedural language. Foreign media frequently cite them as Minsk’s official line. Among state media, the agency has the largest YouTube audience — 1.48 million subscribers — and serves as the main supplier of “facts” to other outlets.

The TV channels “Belarus‑1,” “First Information”, STV, and ONT target domestic audiences, transforming the official position into more emotionally charged formats. They are included in the free TV package and are coordinated by the president’s press secretary, Natalia Eismont.

Alongside TV a specialized ideological press  operates. The presidential administration’s newspaper “SB. Belarus Segodnya” (“СБ. Беларусь сегодня”) is aimed at officials and loyalists,  transmitting “correct” interpretation of events for the administrative elite. The army newspaper “For the Glory of the Motherland” (“Во славу Родины”) addresses servicemen and the patriotic segment of the public in a mobilizing tone. For example, on July 24 it ran an article titled “Vultures are Preparing for War,” which analyzed the remarks of the U.S. Army Europe commander about NATO plans. The tone was the exact opposite of BELTA’s diplomatic restraint.

“Telegram” channels have become a new tier in the Belarusian information space. Official channels of ministries and agencies duplicate state‑media information, offering space for comments. Pro‑government bloggers and “independent” analysts create a sense of pluralism, although they all hew to the same — state — line. Aggregator channels repost each other, creating the illusion that something is so important that “everyone is talking about it,” although in reality all rely on a single source.

This system is controlled on two levels. The presidential administration, via the Main Directorate of Ideology and the Press Service, coordinates overall strategy; the Information Ministry handles operational management, budget planning, and media financing.

How the ground was prepared: from vultures to peace. Messaging moved through three phases: expectation-setting, heroics and a quick return to businesslike tone afterwards

Coverage of the “Zapad‑2025” exercises can be divided into three distinct phases.

From July to August, the media created expectations. In this phase, BELTA projected peace and responsibility, “Telegram” — vigilance and readiness, and military publications — mobilization alarm.

“We have reduced the number of troops almost by half and moved their deployment deeper into our territory. Hundreds of kilometers from the border,” BELTA quoted Lukashenko. The decision was supposedly taken “to avoid accusations that Belarus harbors aggressive intentions.” The reason given was NATO’s “Defender Europe 2025” exercises near Belarus’s border.

The logic was simple: we are de‑escalating in response to your maneuvers.

BELTA consistently constructed a narrative of “reasonable peacefulness.”

For instance, Foreign Minister Maksim Ryzhenkov accused European politicians of trying to “turn the EU into a kind of besieged fortress,” contrasting that with the “openness and transparency” of the Belarusian‑Russian drills. Chief of the General Staff Pavel Muraveyko stressed that the exercises were “not directed against any specific country or countries,” and that the areas where they were taking place were “far from the western and southern borders.” The Defense Ministry claimed that “NATO states are using “Zapad‑2025” as a pretext for militarization,” yet all 56 signatories of the OSCE Vienna Document — including NATO countries — had been invited to observe.

Meanwhile, “Telegram” cultivated a different, more aggressive atmosphere.

While BELTA spoke of “inviting observers,” “Telegram” carried posts that “NATO and EU countries ignored the invitation.” The army newspaper, under the headline “Vultures Are Preparing for War,” conveyed a mood that NATO was actively preparing to attack. Remarks by a U.S. general about “wiping the Kaliningrad region off the map” were presented not as rhetoric but as a concrete plan necessitating preventive measures.

In the active phase of the exercises (September 12–16), Belarusian propaganda shifted from dry news to emotionally heroic messaging. It was evidenly coordinated. All platforms simultaneously broadcast core themes about the “highest level of cooperation,” “modern technologies,” and the “professionalism” of participants.

If at first BELTA reported that the drills were proceeding at a brisk pace and that participants were training to repel air attacks and handle emergencies, by the end it had reached the “main exercise” at the 227th training area, where “the enemy was subjected to a fiery defeat using aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, maneuver fire groups, air‑defense systems, and robotic platforms.” Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin emphasized that “the kind of openness we are providing during the “Zapad‑2025” exercises is hard to imagine.”

The cycle began to close around September 17, when the tone abruptly shifted from heroic to businesslike. The Defense Ministry tersely announced: “All “Zapad‑2025” tasks have been completed.”

BELTA returned to the diplomatic frame, stressing that all 56 OSCE states had been notified in advance, while “NATO and EU countries ignored the invitation.”

“Telegram” channels spoke of “lessons learned by potential aggressors.” Military publications focused on technical achievements and “invaluable experience of cooperation.”

This gradual approach led the audience through the full emotional cycle — from cautious readiness through the peak of tension to controlled calm — setting a new level of military readiness as the norm.

Three dominant narratives: “peaceful power” in the diplomatic arena; the “invincible fortress” for domestic mobilization (with heavy technical fetishism of weaponry); “union solidarity” with Russia

In the diplomatic space — “peaceful power.” The main distributor was BELTA. Emphasis: “Zapad‑2025” has purely defensive aims. Central idea: peace can be compelled by force. Belarus is portrayed as a responsible partner that makes concessions to reduce tensions. A notable feature is openness (inviting observers, accrediting foreign journalists) contrasted with supposed Western secrecy.

For domestic consumption and mobilization — the “invincible fortress.” This dominates on “Telegram” and in military outlets (the newspaper “For the Glory of the Motherland” and the military agency “Vayar”). Emphasis: a demonstration of force and readiness to use it against any aggressor. A characteristic feature is technical fetishism: detailed descriptions of weapons and procedures as a means to generate a sense of technological superiority.

The culmination was Lukashenko’s remarks on September 16 during the presentation of state awards. He moved from the usual “we’re not trying to conquer anyone” to a much stronger formulation: “If we want to survive, we must be able to do everything.” Belarus, he said, can inflict “unacceptable damage” on any aggressor that breaks into its territory. Belarusian troops train “with everything from small arms to nuclear warheads.”

The narratives were complemented by the theme of force imbalance. On August 13, Khrenin warned about a Polish force of “30,000–34,000 troops.” Pro‑government “Telegram” channels regularly calculated that “62,000 NATO troops” were concentrated near the Belarusian border, compared with 13,000 participants in the Belarusian‑Russian drills.

“Union solidarity” ran through all materials. BELTA captured it with the description: “Finally, as it should be: we are together. How the first Belarusian‑Russian ‘Zapad’ exercises took place.”

This narrative made active use of World War II symbols. The military newspaper wrote about the heirs of the “victor generation,” portraying military cooperation between the two countries as a continuation of their ancestors’ struggle against “Western threats.”

Alliance with Russia was presented as natural and inevitable in the face of external dangers. Russian servicemembers were described only as “defense partners” and “allies.”

An important component of the narrative was the emphasis on shared threats and shared goals.

Telegram served as a laboratory for testing harder lines, using deliberate emotional swings to sustain engagement before the same themes migrated to traditional media

Unlike traditional media with formal language and one‑way communication, “Telegram” channels created a space for experimentation in shaping public opinion. There the authorities could test reactions to different interpretations of events without acknowledging any link to official statements.

For example, the theme of “fakes” about the Russian army first appeared on “Telegram”. Pro‑government Belarusian bloggers, citing Russian “Z” bloggers, wrote about the “mass spread of fake news about the Zapad‑2025 exercises” and “stories of Belarusian women allegedly raped by Russian soldiers.” Only later did the theme migrate to traditional media, where it was presented in softer language.

“Telegram” rhetoric was also significantly more aggressive, and its engagement mechanics were very different. Channels used “emotional swings” — a deliberate alternation of alarming and reassuring messages — to maintain high audience engagement.

First came alarming signals about NATO military preparations, neighbors’ “provocations,” and threats to national security. Then followed reports about the Belarusian army’s readiness, the power of allied weapons, and the professionalism of servicemembers. This cycle of anxiety, pride, and reassurance repeated throughout the exercises.

“Telegram” channels made active use of visuals — photos of military equipment, maps of troop deployments, and infographics with weapon counts. This content was more emotionally impactful than brief notes from traditional media and stuck in audiences’ memories.

The authorities actively “debunk”

Belarusian authorities did not ignore critical materials; they actively tried to debunk them, creating their own version of events.

A vivid example was the number of exercise participants. When independent analysts and Western sources voiced doubts about the official figure of 13,000, Belarusian media pivoted to the Western military presence near the border. Detailed tables appeared: “Additional air forces moved to airfields in Poland and the Baltic states, with more than 148 aircraft deployed”; “TOTAL: 62,000 NATO troops.”

Critical sources were discredited as “Western propaganda instruments” or “channels of hostile interests.” Independent Belarusian media were labeled “extremist resources,” Western think tanks “NATO instruments,” and Ukrainian sources “the Kyiv regime.”

Outcome: public opinion further prepared for militarization, higher tolerance for defense spending and conscription

For the Lukashenko regime, the key outcome is public opinion’s greater readiness for further militarization. It is framed as a natural and necessary response to external threats. This is especially visible in changing attitudes toward military spending and conscription, as well as the popularity of military‑patriotic events. Whereas these topics previously met some public resistance, after the information campaign around “Zapad‑2025” they are perceived as the inevitable price of national security.

The “culture of readiness” manifests itself in heightened interest in military topics, the popularity of military‑patriotic events, and changing attitudes toward compulsory service among young people. “Telegram” channels have recorded an increase in subscribers to military‑analytical content and intensified discussions on national defense issues.

Analysis of Russian media coverage can be read here.

Translated from Russian and edited by Sanita Jemberga, Re:Baltica

Illustrations Miko Rode

Technical support Madara Eihe

Full versions of report in Russian can be found here