The Evolution of Information Polarisation: An In-Depth Analysis of Belarusian Media Coverage of the 2025 Presidential Election

1. Introduction

In October 2024, the electoral cycle in Belarus commenced with the formal announcement of the presidential election date, registration of candidates, and intensification of political campaigning. The process underwent significant expansion in the ensuing months, namely December 2024 and January 2025, encompassing a range of new events. These included public debates, meetings with voters, analytical reviews in traditional media, and discussions among critics of Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s authoritarian regime concerning the approach to the “single-choice election” and the selection of an appropriate action strategy. Traditionally, the figure of incumbent president Aliaksandr Lukashenka was at the centre of attention, while the leaders of democratic forces in exile, such as Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and Pavel Latushka, were only visible on the periphery, in independent media. The campaign concluded with the Central Election Commission announcing the official results and the post-election publications shaping the overall landscape of the media space.

Information polarisation, the central focus of Media IQ’s research, manifests in the deepening of divisions within the Belarusian media space based on political beliefs and values, as well as interpretations of events. In the context of Belarus, information polarisation combines political polarisation (division along political lines) and affective polarisation (the growth of mutual antipathy and distrust between supporters of different political groups). This phenomenon is characterised by the formation of opposing information camps, increased conflict in political discourse, and the creation of parallel media realities in which the same events are given completely different interpretations.

In the context of growing information polarisation, media monitoring has become not just a practical necessity but a strategic imperative. On the one hand, systematically tracking textual and visual messages enables us to identify the dominant frames through which political messages are disseminated. On the other hand, this process sheds light on the mechanisms by which power is legitimised and opposition voices are marginalised. The channels of communication operating outside formal regulation, such as Telegram communities and independent online publications, are critical to analyse, as alternative narratives spread faster than official statements on these platforms.

The Media IQ study aims to comprehensively analyse how information polarisation has evolved in the Belarusian media’s coverage of the 2025 presidential election. To achieve this, the study set out to: first, organise the main narratives found in both state-run and independent media; second, analyse how these narratives evolved in terms of quality and quantity across three phases of the campaign (October–November 2024, December 2024, and January 2025); third, compare the communication approaches used in traditional media versus digital platforms; and fourth, evaluate how these trends influenced public perception of electoral actors and the extent of audience polarisation.

This study’s distinctive feature is its longitudinal nature, which enables us to trace narrative transformations at every phase of the electoral cycle and identify the mechanisms behind the formation of parallel information realities. Unlike most existing works, which focus on a static cross-section of information or individual aspects of propaganda, this study takes a comprehensive approach. It combines quantitative analysis of references with qualitative assessment of semantic constructions. This allows us to record the dynamics of information polarisation and its impact on public perception of political processes.

The study’s empirical basis was a sample of 20 leading media outlets, comprising ten pro-governmental and ten independent platforms. These included TV channels, print media, online media outlets and Telegram channels. The methodology was based on a content analysis involving the detailed coding of lexical, stylistic, and framing markers and the quantitative counting of mentions and thematic clusters. The qualitative component involved analysing key publications and messages using discourse analysis. This facilitated identifying hidden meanings and comparing interpretations in different media outlets.

2. Research methodology

This study is based on a representative sample of 20 key Belarusian media outlets, categorised as either state and pro-governmental (TV stations, official publications, and government internet portals) or independent and opposition (online publications and Telegram channels that freely disseminate alternative opinions). This pairwise selection enabled direct comparisons between media strategies, revealing systemic differences in the presentation of electoral narratives.

The study was structured around three time periods, corresponding to the key phases of the election cycle: October–November 2024, marked by the articulation of core electoral messages and candidate registration; December 2024, characterised by intensified conflict between the narratives of “stability” and “exposing falsehoods”; and January 2025, focused on reactions to the election results and the consolidation of dominant power narratives. This chronological breakdown enabled us to track the evolution of the key frames and their relative pitch at each phase of the campaign.

A pre-designed coding scheme was used to conduct the content analysis. During the coding process, the following were recorded:

– lexical markers indicating key themes (such as “sovereignty”, “democracy”, “stability”, etc.);

– evaluative epithets and stylistic devices (including metaphors and appeals to national values);

– legitimation frames (mechanisms used to justify decisions made by those in power) and discreditation frames (methods used to undermine alternative candidates and institutions).

External narrative types, such as “Western interference”, “international support”, and “threats to national sovereignty”, were given special attention, with subsequent analysis of their frequency and connotative content.

For the quantitative part of the research, the frequency with which key terms and frames were referenced in each media group and at each election cycle phase was calculated. A tonal analysis of publications, which involved assessing the distribution of positive, neutral and negative evaluations of electoral subjects, was also conducted. The qualitative study employed discourse analysis — an in-depth examination of representative texts and messages — to identify subtextual constructions and determine how different platforms establish semantic “parallels” or “contrasts” in relation to the same event. The synergy of quantitative and qualitative methods provided a multi-layered understanding of media polarisation processes and revealed patterns of meaning transformation during the electoral cycle.

In addition to the central monitoring of three chronological periods, the study incorporated a special methodological component: a case study of coverage of the presidential inauguration, which took place on 25 March 2025. This methodological approach enabled a more in-depth analysis of the specific media event that falls outside the chronological scope of the central monitoring but is particularly important for understanding the point at which information polarisation culminates. The case study analysed all media publications from one day, 25 March, when Aliaksandr Lukashenka was inaugurated. Particular attention was paid to quantitative asymmetries in coverage, linguistic markers of polarisation, and the symbolic confrontation of narratives. This focused analysis provided additional depth to the study, enabling us to identify persistent patterns of information polarisation at their most concentrated.

3. Transformation of key narratives by election cycle phase

During the 2025 presidential election cycle in Belarus, there was a noticeable transformation in narratives in the media space, particularly evident in the confrontation between state and independent sources. Although each cycle phase had its emphases, there was a general trend towards increasing polarisation and tougher rhetoric throughout the process.

During the first phase (late October to late November 2024), state sources created the image of the election as a symbol of stability and electoral sovereignty in the media space. News reports and official statements stressed that “the elections are held for ourselves”, firmly rejecting any attempts at external interference or the imposition of so-called “dubious initiatives”. During this period, the Central Election Commission was presented as a guarantor of legality and transparency, and the legitimacy of the authorities was connected exclusively with internal support: “The true legitimacy of the authorities comes exclusively from the Belarusian people, not from the assessments of international observers”. At the same time, independent sources emphasised the lack of genuine competition, the emergence of spoiler candidates, and the ritualistic and formal nature of the election. Their publications contained assessments of the “impermeability” of the electoral space and the predetermined nature of the results: “The results of the election are predetermined”, noted the journalists and experts.

During the second phase (December 2024 to January 2025), the clash of narratives within the media space intensified. State sources emphasised the importance of stability and electoral sovereignty, presenting the election as the most significant event for the country. The news highlighted that “the Central Election Commission of the Republic of Belarus enjoys considerable authority beyond our borders”, and the presence of international observers was portrayed as proof of the process’s transparency despite the absence of the OSCE/ODIHR mission. Statements that Belarus was not guided by Western standards were becoming increasingly frequent: “We hold elections for ourselves, for the Belarusian people”. Demonstration of mass support for the incumbent authorities intensified, including through quotations from “ordinary Belarusians” and representatives of pro-governmental organisations.

In contrast, the independent segment of the media space featured systematic discourses on the unfree and undemocratic nature of the election and the “exposing falsehoods”. The articles referenced the opinions of Western politicians and experts who labelled the campaign a “circus” and emphasised the impossibility of fair elections in conditions of mass repression and lack of freedom of speech. Special emphasis was placed on the formal nature of the campaign and the absence of genuine competition among the candidates. For instance, Pavel Latushka made a direct accusation against the candidates during an interview with the Pozirk news agency, labelling them as “fakes” and emphasising that their involvement would not influence the outcome of the campaign.

At the final phase of the election cycle in January 2025, the media space exhibited pronounced polarisation, with narratives assuming a high degree of rigidity and unambiguity. The overarching theme that emerged was one of total control, stability, and “unity” around the incumbent president, dominated state sources. The entire state propaganda apparatus was mobilised in support of Aliaksandr Lukashenka, with the large-scale campaign Unity Marathon serving as the basis for his electoral platform. Most candidates did not attempt to position themselves as an alternative, and their rhetoric included calls for unity. “Complementing, not competing”, stated candidate Siarhei Syrankou, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus.

On election day, state sources continued to campaign for Lukashenka, which was a violation of the law. According to the monitoring report by “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections”, the agency Minsk-Novosti published materials where the incumbent president was presented as the only guarantor of stability. Exhibitions of his “achievements” were organised in Homel, sometimes even using photos taken in other countries. The results of the pro-government exit poll were announced 12 minutes after the polling stations closed, almost coinciding with the official results (87.6% of votes being for Lukashenka).

During this period, the independent media space documented a variety of repressive measures. These included new arrests, pressure on individuals, internet shutdowns, blocking of VPNs and websites, and severe restrictions on voters. The publications emphasised that the election was held in an atmosphere of fear and total control and that any alternative voices were either marginalised or suppressed by force.

Therefore, during the election cycle, the key narratives in the Belarusian media space evolved from being procedure-oriented and institutional to being highly polarised and ideologised. State sources consistently emphasised stability, sovereignty and “unity”, while independent sources highlighted undemocratic, repressive and formalistic electoral processes. This transformation vividly illustrates not only the dynamics of the campaign itself but also the general state of the media landscape of modern Belarus.

4. The evolution of electoral subjects’ image

Throughout the 2025 presidential election cycle in Belarus, the image of the key electoral subjects in the media landscape changed noticeably, reflecting the campaign’s internal dynamics and the growing polarisation between state and independent sources.

During the campaign’s initial phase in October and November 2024, state sources primarily presented Aliaksandr Lukashenka as a guarantor of stability and legality. His image was rather institutionalised, focusing on his role as an effective head of state who ensures that election is held “in strict compliance with the law”. During this period, the official media focused on procedural issues and the work of the Central Election Commission. They emphasised that “the true legitimacy of the authorities comes exclusively from the Belarusian people, not from the assessments of international observers”. Other candidates, such as Hanna Kanapatskaya, were only mentioned in state publications in the context of registration or the technical details of their campaigns. There were no personal presentations or attempts to disclose their political position. At the same time, the independent media have questioned the independence of these candidates as early as that time, labelling them “spoiler candidates” and noting that their participation merely creates the illusion of competitiveness: “Spoiler candidates support the regime to lend legitimacy to the election”.

In the second phase, in December 2024, Lukashenka’s image as the sole guarantor of the country’s sovereignty and stability became dominant in the media landscape. The state media increasingly emphasised his exceptional role. ONT and STV channels used phrases such as “Belarus demonstrates an example of a stable electoral system”. At the same time, the incumbent president was portrayed as “the only candidate capable of ensuring the country’s sovereignty”. Ihar Karpenka, the Chairman of the Central Election Commission, also became a key quoted figure due to his statements about the transparency and legality of the election. According to Media IQ analysis, he was the most quoted subject of the campaign in the official media. During the same period, independent media outlets intensified their criticism, emphasising the campaign’s formal and ritualistic nature. In the independent media landscape, attention increasingly focused on figures in exile, such as Sviatlana Tsikhanovskaya and Pavel Latushka, rather than on the candidates themselves. The topic of political repression also received significant attention.

In January 2025, at the final phase of the cycle, Lukashenka’s image had finally been consolidated as a symbol of “unity” and “stability”. Large-scale support campaigns were launched by state media, such as the Unity Marathon, in which Lukashenka was presented as a “guarantor of peace” and a “leader who united the nation”. The other candidates did not even attempt to distance themselves from pro-government discourse. By this time, references to the presidential candidates in the independent media had been minimal, and the primary focus was on the fact that the Central Election Commission had ultimately become an instrument for legitimising the results.

5. Polarisation of the media landscape: from divergence to parallel realities

During the initial phase of the cycle (23 October–30 November 2024), although both state and independent media reported on similar facts — such as registration announcements, participant numbers, and official statements from the Central Election Commission — they diverged significantly in how they interpreted these events. While pro-government channels described the process as “reliably transparent” and “reflecting the will of the people”, independent media used more critical language, describing it as “ceremony”, “imitation”, and “fictitious competition”. In 85% of cases, there was a high degree of consistency in the references to dates and figures. However, the assessments and epithets used to describe these events, such as “legitimacy” vs “masquerade”, created diametrically opposite meanings.

This tendency towards different interpretations of facts is supported by Media IQ’s monitoring data on compliance with news journalism standards, which found that state media violated at least one news journalism standard in 98% of the stories studied in January 2025. The most common violations were in the standards for distinguishing between facts and opinions (61.96%) and ensuring the completeness of information (50.11%), allowing the promotion of set narratives based more on value judgments than factual basis. For example, the ONT piece on Lukashenka’s election programme fails to distinguish between facts and opinions: “In everyday life, we usually don’t give it much thought — this thing here, and that thing there, and that other thing over there is Belarusian-made… However, when we consider the matter as a whole, it becomes evident that everything around is Belarusian-made, left, right and centre. Is it an achievement? Undoubtedly”. State media were typical of such emotional assessments presented as facts.

By the middle of the cycle (1-31 December 2024), the event framing gap had only deepened. The pro-government media actively exploited the theme of stability and socio-economic continuity, portraying “stability” not just as a characteristic but as a manifesto for protecting people from the “chaos of change”. At the same time, independent publications and Telegram channels were focused on “exposing falsehoods”, highlighting discrepancies between official reports and observers’ testimonies and describing the election as a “manipulative spectacle”. During this period, linguistic markers of polarisation acquired more pronounced emotional connotations. Some texts contained words such as “sovereignty”, “unity”, and “national choice”, while others mentioned “deception”, “usurpation”, and “violation”.

The final phase (January 2025) resulted in the formation of two virtually autonomous information worlds. For supporters of the authorities, the campaign confirmed the “right choice of the political course” and “unanimous support” of the population. This was backed up by quotes from officials and statistical calculations from the Central Election Commission. On the other hand, alternative channels built a narrative of “undemocratic election”, “massive fraud”, and “international condemnation”. Consequently, each audience received a unique “package of facts” and “set of meanings” with minimal overlap.

Analysis of linguistic and stylistic markers shows that, throughout the campaign, the proportion of emotional and evaluative epithets in pro-governmental publications increased from 12% to 22% and from 18% to 28% in independent publications. The use of threat-related terms such as “enemy”, “subversion”, and “conspiracy” almost doubled in independent sources, while official channels made more appeals to collective identity and “civic duty”. This linguistic dynamic has conserved the self-perpetuating nature of information replenishment within each of the “parallel realities”, making dialogue virtually impossible.

The polarisation of the media landscape was clearly evident in the headlines dedicated to the presidential inauguration. The state and pro-government media used the following phrases: “Lukashenka called the election in Belarus an international standard” (KP Belarus); “This victory is not mine alone” (Sputnik Belarus); and “We are united and stronger than ever, says Lukashenka” (BelTA). At the same time, independent publications opted for fundamentally different wording: “Lukashenka self-initiated” (Euroradio), “Lukashenka wore a stained jacket to the inauguration” (Nasha Niva). Thus, two conflicting images of the same event emerged even at the headline level.

6. The international context in electoral discourse

During the election cycle, the international context played an important role in electoral discourse, evolving from abstract references to employing concrete historical and political analogies. During the initial election phase, references to foreign experience were generalised. The media merely mentioned “international standards” or “generally accepted practices” without providing details. As early as December, comparisons with specific events in world politics emerged, ranging from election campaigns in Eastern European countries to protest movements in neighbouring states. This trend peaked in January 2025, when journalists drew direct parallels with the 2024 Russian election, highlighting the similarities in the tools and methods used to control information and legitimise the results.

The narrative about “Western interference” showed the most visible growth. While in October and November, its share of the total number of publications fluctuated around 1.29%, by the end of the campaign, this figure had risen to 2.36%. The pro-government media increasingly portrayed external criticism as part of a hybrid war, presenting that the West has an interest in seeking to destabilise the country. Meanwhile, independent platforms inverted this message, using the narrative of “Western interference” to draw attention to the shortcomings of the electoral process and advocate for closer monitoring by international organisations.

The “international support” narrative has evolved as a parallel theme. At first, references to the goodwill of foreign partners were sporadic and situational, such as comments made by individual diplomats. During the second phase, “international support” became a key argument for opposition media outlets. Reports on joint statements by human rights defenders and EU and US observers were published in prominent places, and statistics on the number of missions were regularly quoted. By the end of the cycle, this narrative had become a counterpoint to “Western interference”, portraying external scrutiny as a means of safeguarding democratic principles.

Against the backdrop of similarities between the two countries’ political regimes and electoral practices, a number of media outlets drew comparisons with the 2024 Russian election. In both Belarus and Russia, elections were not used as an instrument of real political competition but rather as a means of demonstrating mass support for the incumbent president. The only intriguing aspect of the cycle was the subject of active discussion in the Belarusian information field: would the Central Election Commission dare to award Aliaksandr Lukashenka a higher percentage of votes than Vladimir Putin received in the 2024 Russian election (87%)? Eventually, Lukashenka’s official result of 86.82% was almost identical to the Russian one. Both independent and Western analysts emphasised this figure’s symbolic importance for legitimising power.

A comparison with the 2024 Russian election cycle revealed both similarities and differences. In both contexts, the state media relied on foreign policy arguments to strengthen the legitimacy of the ruling elite and discredit critics. However, the Russian case demonstrated a more rigid centralisation of the media landscape and greater involvement of international organisations as a “neutral arbiter”. At the same time, the Belarusian election involved a more active use of digital channels and messengers. This enriched the international discourse with new formats, ranging from video broadcasts of foreign press conferences to interactive maps of political relationships.

Coverage of the international reaction to the election also revealed a high level of polarisation. BelTA purposefully focused on congratulations from a select group of countries: “Lukashenka singled out Russia and China as two of Belarus’s closest allies”. SB. Belarus Segodnya emphasised the recognition of the incumbent president’s “long-standing work”, highlighting that he has turned the country into a state that “enjoys respect in the international arena”. By contrast, RFE/RL Belarus consistently emphasised that the democratic countries did not recognise the results: “The Central Election Commission announced the final results of the presidential election, which is not recognised in the democratic world”. Nasha Niva drew direct parallels with the Russian election: “The results are almost identical: Putin received 87.28% of the vote in 2024, while Lukashenka was awarded 86.82%”.

7. The militarisation and securitisation of electoral discourse

Throughout the 2025 presidential election cycle, security steadily emerged as a central topic in the media, taking on a progressively more militarised and securitised tone. As early as the initial phase in the autumn of 2024, state media and pro-government Telegram channels started incorporating references to military doctrine and national unity rhetoric in response to external threats into the electoral agenda. These references were generally declarative. On air, representatives of the Ministry of Defence commented about “readiness to defend the borders”, and the news emphasised that “the main task of the officer corps of Belarus is to rally around our commander-in-chief”. Meanwhile, independent media outlets and Telegram channels offered a critical interpretation of these signals, emphasising the risks of the political process becoming militarised and viewing them as an attempt to divert attention away from acute domestic political issues.

In December 2024, during the campaign’s second phase, the militarisation markers emerged more often. Pro-government sources have increasingly quoted military and security officials who suggest that the election should have been seen as a “test of cohesion” and “an example of the people’s readiness to repel external threats”. The rhetoric in Telegram channels became even more militant: posts were framed as “reports from the front lines”, contrasting the “agitation front” with the “opposition’s sabotage”. In turn, the official media used more restrained language, such as “ensuring security” and “protecting sovereignty”. However, they regularly broadcast stories about law enforcement training, special service exercises and readiness for “any provocation”. At the meetings attended by the heads of the Emergency Response Ministry, it was emphasised that more than 5,000 rescuers and 1,500 pieces of equipment would be involved in ensuring security at polling stations. Task forces have also been created nationwide to respond to emergencies. The Minister for Emergency Response, Vadzim Siniauski, stated, “We have an important event ahead of us: the presidential election in Belarus. Our job is to ensure that this event is held in a safe environment”.

By the end of the campaign in January 2025, the militarisation of discourse will have reached its maximum intensity. Pro-government publications and Telegram channels emphasised that the election is a “nationwide mobilisation project”, presenting every voter as a “soldier of the information front”. During this period, the STV TV channel broadcast stories with headlines such as “Belarus is set to be the target of an attack”, while BelTA quoted Aliaksandr Lukashenka as saying, “NATO is doing everything to drag Belarus into the conflict” and “the world is wobbling, and Belarus is walking on the edge of the abyss of a systemic geopolitical crisis”. Even the ceremonial aspects of the campaign had a militarised character. On election days, for example, Belarusian servicemen took an oath of allegiance to the people and the president, a ceremony that received extensive coverage in the state media.

By contrast, independent media interpreted this rhetoric as an attempt to suppress civic activity through fear, likening it to “military propaganda” and “regime training exercises”. They emphasised that, on voting days, law enforcement agencies ramped up public rhetoric about the need for control and the prevention of provocations and “destructive activity” while recording cases of mass detentions, restrictions on internet access, and blocking of VPN services.

The militarisation and securitisation of electoral discourse were evident in the vocabulary and imagery used and in the concrete actions of state structures. This made security a key part of the electoral agenda and a means of legitimising power under the authoritarian regime.

8. Case study: The inauguration as a culmination of information polarisation

Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s inauguration on 25 March 2025 was a significant moment in the evolution of information polarisation within the Belarusian media landscape. Although this event falls outside the chronological scope of the base monitoring, analysing it enables us to observe the culmination of the fragmentation and isolation of information realities that occurred throughout the election cycle.

8.1. Unprecedented asymmetry in coverage scope

The first indicator of the extreme polarisation of the media discourse was the unprecedented asymmetry in the volume of coverage of the inauguration. The state media demonstrated a strategy of information dominance. BelTA published 27 articles in one day; KP Belarus and Sputnik Belarus published 13 articles each; and the Belarus 1 TV channel broadcast 11 stories. By contrast, independent media outlets published significantly fewer articles: Euroradio – 1; Nasha Niva – 1; RFE/RL Belarus – 1.

This disproportion not only reflects different levels of access to official events, but also fundamentally different attitudes towards the newsworthy event. The inauguration became a central event requiring comprehensive coverage for state media, while independent media saw it as a procedural episode not worthy of detailed attention due to its perceived illegitimacy.

8.2. Consolidation of opposing narratives

The content analysis reveals the final consolidation of the opposing narratives that emerged throughout the election cycle. The state media focused on three interrelated sets of meanings:

1. The narrative of people’s unity and support: “This victory is not just mine” (Sputnik Belarus); “Lukashenka: We are united and stronger than ever” (BelTA); “Minsk residents and visitors welcomed the President’s motorcade” (Belarus 1).

2. The narrative of the historical mission and continuity: “Lukashenka called a new historical chance for Belarus” (KP Belarus), “Belarusian servicemen swore allegiance to the people and the president” (KP Belarus).

3. The narrative of confronting external threats: “Lukashenka: NATO is doing everything to drag Belarus into the conflict” (Sputnik Belarus); “Lukashenka: The world is wobbling, and Belarus is walking on the edge of a systemic geopolitical crisis abyss” (BelTA).

In turn, independent media outlets formed counternarratives that completely contradicted the official interpretation of the event:

1. The narrative of the imitated procedure: “Lukashenka self-inaugurates” (Euroradio), “an empty, meaningless performance” (Tsikhanovskaya, quoted in a Pozirk piece).

2. The narrative of lack of international recognition: “The Central Election Commission announced the final results of the presidential election, which is not recognised in the democratic world” (RFE/RL Belarus).

3. The narrative of the repressive nature of the regime: “Repression of the people as a tool to maintain power” (RFE/RL Belarus), “Starting from March 24, access to Belarusian websites from abroad to be restricted for more than 24 hours” (RFE/RL Belarus).

By the time of the inauguration, the two sides’ narratives had reached their maximum level of content coherence and mutual opposition. While there were areas of partial overlap in discourses at the earlier phases of the election cycle (for example, the recognition of the election and its political meaning being interpreted in different ways), such overlaps had effectively disappeared by the inauguration.

8.3. Linguistic strategies as markers of polarisation

The different media’s use of linguistic strategies in their coverage of the inauguration was particularly revealing. The state media favoured a declarative style, using methods of linguistic objectification to express subjective assessments. Examples include “Lukashenka called the election in Belarus an international standard” and “Lukashenka said that half the world dreams of a Belarusian ‘dictatorship’” (both KP Belarus).

By contrast, independent media outlets actively employed linguistic markers of doubt and delegitimisation. Examples include scare-quoting words such as “election”, “inauguration” and “victory”, as well as coining neologisms such as “self-inauguration”. The Nasha Niva piece, “Lukashenka wore a stained jacket to the inauguration”, is an example of personalised criticism through attention to appearance details. This fundamentally contradicts the strategy of “humanising” the president in state media.

It is noteworthy that some publications attempted to adopt a neutral stance. Onliner offered only the briefest of reports, stating simply that “Presidential inauguration took place in Minsk”, while Pozirk provided a platform for various interpretations of the event. However, even these attempts at balanced coverage reveal an underlying polarisation of the media landscape. The prospect of providing a neutral, factual description of an event, rather than an ideological interpretation, is becoming increasingly problematic.

8.4. The formation of autonomous media ecosystems

Analysis of inauguration coverage reveals the emergence of two distinctly autonomous media ecosystems, each operating under different principles and targeting various audiences. A clear hierarchy of information roles existed within the state media system. BelTA acted as the primary source of official interpretation. KP Belarus and Sputnik Belarus expanded on and provided additional detail for this interpretation. Meanwhile, the Belarus 1 TV channel provided a visual accompaniment to the narrative. STV complemented the overall picture with anti-Western rhetoric and an emphasis on security issues.

The independent media system also developed a functional distribution network. RFE/RL Belarus focused on factual delegitimisation, while Eroradio developed linguistic tools to cast doubt. Nasha Niva used a strategy of personalised criticism, referring to unofficial details of the event.

The functional specialisation of media within each ecosystem indicates the high maturity level of competing information universes, in which each outlet plays a specific role in maintaining the overall narrative. At the same time, there is minimal mutual citation and audience overlap between these ecosystems, creating the effect of “information bubbles” that are inaccessible to alternative viewpoints.

8.5. Symbolic confrontation of dates and traditions

What made the inauguration on 25 March 2025 particularly notable was its coincidence with Freedom Day, the anniversary of the Belarusian People’s Republic proclamation. This created an additional level of symbolic confrontation. Independent media outlets actively exploited this context. Euroradio published a piece entitled «Freedom Day: Why Lukashenka dislikes and is scared of this holiday”, while Pozirk regularly referenced Freedom Day and the anniversary of the Belarusian People’s Republic. Together, these publications created a symbolic contrast between the official celebrations and an alternative historical tradition.

By contrast, the state media completely ignored this parallel, constructing the historical context by appealing to different symbolic resources: “The authorities are the successors of the WWII winners” (Belarus 1), “Time has chosen us” (Belarus 1). This clash of historical narratives shows that the polarisation of the media affects not only current political issues but also fundamental ideas about national identity and historical heritage.

8.6. Conclusions: Inauguration as a reflection of maximum polarisation

The case study of the media coverage of Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s inauguration on 25 March 2025 enables us to draw several significant conclusions.

1. By the end of the electoral cycle, information polarisation in Belarus had reached its maximum level. The state and independent media had formed completely autonomous information realities with minimal overlap in terms of facts and interpretation.

2. Both sides have developed systemic linguistic strategies, creating specific markers of belonging to a particular media ecosystem. The neutral position is becoming problematic and exceptional.

3. Historical symbolism and commemorative practices have become a key battleground for ideological conflict, exacerbating divisions in how audiences perceive current events and understand national history.

4. The state media system has significantly greater capabilities for achieving information dominance in terms of the volume of content, access to official sources and variety of formats. In contrast, independent media compensate for their lack of resources through creative use of language and non-standard formats of coverage.

Thus, the inauguration marks not only the formal end of the electoral cycle but also the culmination of the process of information polarisation. At this point, the unified Belarusian media landscape splits into two parallel worlds, each with its own rules for constructing meaning, linguistic markers and historical symbolism. This process is not only a reflection of political division but also an active factor that contributes to the deepening and consolidation of this division in the collective consciousness of different groups within the population.

The presentation of information about the inauguration was so different that the event itself was almost unrecognisable. Thus, BelTA wrote: “This is a holiday for the whole Belarusian people”, while Pozirk quoted Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya as saying that the ceremony was “an empty, meaningless performance”. Even the technical details revealed a significant difference in tone and content: while Nasha Niva drew attention to the president’s “stained jacket”, the state media emphasised the solemnity and historical significance of the moment. The contrast in coverage went far beyond the usual differences in editorial policy, signalling the emergence of fundamentally incompatible information realities.

9. Digital environment and audience engagement

During the 2025 presidential election cycle, the digital landscape emerged as a pivotal arena for shaping and disseminating electoral narratives and engaging diverse audiences. As Media IQ data shows, maximum polarisation manifested itself in the online space: state and independent sources created two virtually non-overlapping information realities, each interpreting the course and results of the election differently.

In the digital environment, YouTube has become a key platform for sharing electoral narratives and gauging audience engagement. During the first two months of the election cycle (October–November 2024), videos from pro-government channels received an average of 15,000–20,000 views. The number of likes was around 1,200, and the number of comments per video was 150–200. Independent platforms with comparatively smaller coverage (8,000–12,000 views) demonstrated a higher comments-to-views ratio (up to 3%), indicating a more active reflexive audience.

In the final phase (January 2025), engagement reached its peak. Videos illustrating “mass support” and “unity of the people” received over 40,000 views on pro-government channels. Meanwhile, the most viral publications by independent media outlets, which exposed violations and called for international observers, received over 35,000 views and 500 comments. The comparative analysis showed that pro-government strategies based on clear visualisation of official data and concise slogans resulted in a higher conversion rate of views to likes (5–6%), whereas independent formats with a greater emotional impact generated a higher level of discussion (1.5–1.8% of views to comment ratio).

Emotional content markers were a key factor in attracting attention: videos that appealed to patriotic sentiments or the “fight narrative” increased engagement by 20–25% compared to neutral news stories. Consequently, the digital media landscape became an effective arena for narrative competition, with content emphasising emotional rhetoric demonstrating the most significant capacity to mobilise audiences and prompt feedback.

The state propaganda machine used digital platforms to encourage voter participation and present the election as a “celebration of unity” and a reaffirmation of stability. Special attention was paid to TikTok, which experts say has become the most popular social media platform among Belarusians over 18. The platform has over 5.6 million users in the country. Short clips featuring Aliaksandr Lukashenka were published on pro-government TikTok accounts. In them, he could be seen scolding officials, handing out gifts, meeting with students and talking about his habits. Such content aimed to “humanise” the president’s image and make him appear more approachable to young people. However, as Media IQ analysts note, Belarusian youth were not particularly engaged despite the videos receiving millions of views. Many subscribers to pro-government channels were from other countries, and the videos often did not go beyond propaganda templates and failed to elicit an authentic response from the intended audience.

The most popular YouTube videos during the election period clearly demonstrated differences in the presentation of information. Thus, Malanka Media’s most successful piece of content (259,907 views) bore the headline “The situation is CRITICAL: Poland gives Lukashenka an ultimatum. What should we prepare for?” emphasising the problematic aspects of the regime. At the same time, the most popular video on the state-owned STV channel (with 79,833 views) was titled “Belarus is set to be the target of an attack. Europeans are tired of what is happening in the EU. Replacement for UN”, portraying the country as surrounded by enemies. Even the format of the headlines demonstrated fundamental differences. For example, Belsat used the emotional marker “⚡️⚡️ Belarusians take to the streets against Lukashenka’s ‘election’”, whereas ONT used more restrained language that emphasised international recognition: “Topics Lukashenka discussed with the Pan-African Parliament delegation”.

The linguistic strategies employed by the media were becoming an increasingly vivid indicator of positioning. Independent media outlets consistently used “scare quotes” when referring to official procedures. For example, Euroradio wrote that “Lukashenka ‘self-inaugurated’”, and Nasha Niva consistently put the words “election”, “victory”, and “the re-elected one” in quotation marks. In its materials, Belsat used the wording “⚡️⚡️ Belarusians take to the streets against Lukashenka’s ‘election’”, scare-quoting the word “election” visually emphasising doubts about the legitimacy of the procedure. In contrast, the state media employed the strategy of linguistic objectification of subjective assessments. For instance, KP Belarus reported that “Lukashenka said that half the world dreams of a Belarusian ‘dictatorship’”, placing scare quotes around “dictatorship” to indicate the untenability of such a definition.

10. Particularities of coverage by different types of media

The study revealed a significant variety of media strategies, even among outlets formally united by a shared editorial approach. Some pro-government channels emphasised aggressive rhetoric in support of the official results, while others were more restrained, stressing institutional commitment and societal “emotional stability” above all else. Independent publications demonstrated similar diversification. Some focused on real-time investigations of violations, some on journalistic reviews, and some specialised in visual “fact-checking” and analysis of multimedia evidence.

The so-called borderline sites, such as Tochka and Sputnik Belarus, played a special role in the information field. They occupied an intermediate position between official and entirely oppositional channels. They provided readers with information in a more neutral format, albeit with overtones of either criticism or support. By combining authoritative quotes from officials and experts with references to isolated incidents, their reports were able to attract a diverse audience and act as a bridge between two different information worlds.

Tochka and Onliner, which are still able to operate in Belarus, showed peculiar covering strategies. While Onliner limited itself to an extremely brief report, stating simply that “The inauguration of the president took place in Minsk”, and avoided making any evaluative judgements, Tochka attempted to imitate a normal political process by publishing materials such as “Marriage at 17 and a strong parliament: Studying the election programme of Hanna Kanapatskaya”. This approach created the illusion of genuine political competition, filling the gap between state media’s overt propaganda and independent outlets’ critical coverage.

As repressive measures intensified, some independent media outlets adopted a “minimal coverage” strategy. Publications were released in brief summaries, lacking detailed commentaries and analytical conclusions. This approach helped protect authors and platforms from administrative harassment. Meanwhile, some publications stuck to a niche coverage area, such as tracking trials against activists or monitoring the activities of law enforcers. This enabled them to delve deeply into one thematic niche and communicate their findings effectively to target groups.

Thus, a complex mosaic of strategies was observed even within similar media outlets, ranging from the active promotion of official narratives to cautious minimalism and niche specialisation. This suggests the media sector is highly adaptable in response to external constraints and internal editorial objectives.

11. Theoretical reflection on the results

In the context of Media IQ research, the concept of “parallel information realities” becomes a key part of the analytical framework. During the campaign, two distinct discourses emerged: one presented the election as an expression of the people’s sovereign will and a guarantee of stability, while the other treated it as a phased event with a predetermined outcome. While these “realities” overlapped in facts — the data on turnout and voting coincided in most cases — they diverged in terms of interpretation, emotional assessment, and appeal to values. This created an effect of informational isolation for audiences.

In this case, information polarisation is considered not only an editorial choice but also an indication of the deep socio-political divisions within Belarusian society. With such framing, the media does not perform the passive function of delivering facts; rather, it becomes an active co-author of political reality. This creates groups of people with different perceptions of the legitimacy and fairness of elections. This dichotomy recreates the extremes of support and non-recognition within society, turning the media into an arena for ideological conflict.

In the Belarusian case, the question of legitimacy is no longer limited to formal compliance with procedural norms; it has become a matter of demonstrating loyalty and recognising the current authorities. The focus here is on a corpus of narratives reinforced through the constant relaying of official messages and the promotion of the idea of “people’s unity”. At the same time, independent media outlets and opposition groups provide an alternative, “counter-legitimising” interpretation of these procedures, appealing to international standards. In these circumstances, the legitimacy of Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s power emerges as a multi-layered construct, with “lawfulness” and “recognition” diverging through different communication channels.

In the future, Belarus’s media landscape will likely continue fragmenting due to technical factors, such as the growth in digital channels and audience fragmentation, as well as political circumstances, such as the strengthening of censorship and the risk of self-censorship. There may be an increase in “microparallels” — niche ecosystems where specific groups receive highly specialised, targeted content. At the same time, foreign attention and the development of independent platforms can encourage the emergence of hybrid forms of journalism that connect these “realities” via metanarratives and comparative reviews. Consequently, the Belarusian media landscape will become increasingly diverse but potentially more substantial regarding critical analysis and interdisciplinary dialogue.

12. Conclusion and prognostic trends

The three-phase monitoring of media coverage of the 2025 presidential election in Belarus revealed a consistent evolution in the key narratives and communicative strategies employed by different media groups. The first phase was dominated by discourses of “electoral sovereignty” and “imitation of democratic procedures”, reflecting the fundamental perception of the procedural level of election. In the second phase, the focus shifted towards opposing “stability” and “exposing falsehoods”, with both sides intensifying their framing of the issue through the lens of social fears and expectations. By the final phase, narratives had solidified around the “confirmation of the government’s course” and accusations of “undemocratic election”, contributing to forming two autonomous information worlds.

The analysis revealed patterns typical of authoritarian media spaces, such as the gradual centralisation of attention on official institutions, the marginalisation of alternative voices, and the active securitisation of discourse. Meanwhile, independent and borderline platforms quickly adapted their coverage formats, adopting discursive strategies of exposure and niche specialisation. The dynamics of quantitative indicators, ranging from the frequency of references to engagement indices, verified these qualitative shifts. They also demonstrated the resilience of both sides of the campaign in the face of information pressure.

During the post-election period, the fragmentation of the information landscape is likely to increase. Alongside large “microcosms” of audiences, new intersections of narratives will emerge, giving rise to hybrid formats of analytics and comparative reviews. At the same time, the growth in repressive control and censorship practices could lead to the further automation of content “micro-filtering” and the reinforcement of self-censorship.